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Religious Liberalism: Issues of Religious Minorities in Georgia 
Logan Hulsey 
Abstract 
Since 2012, there have been several issues concerning the Georgian Muslim community.  
These issues include the dismantling of a minaret, the dispute over ruined mosque, and the 
nailing of a pig’s head to a madrassa door.  Common causes attributed to these events are the 
failure of the Central Government to react properly to these issues, the attitudes and rhetoric 
of the Georgian Orthodox Church, and popular Turkophobia.  This research seeks to find the 
cause of these issues and investigate what they reveal about the democratization process of 
Georgia.  The hypotheses investigated include the roles of the Georgian Central Government, 
The Georgian Orthodox Church, and popular Turkophobia in instigating these cases.  This 
qualitative research investigates each of the cases of discrimination involving the Georgian 
Muslim minority originating from Adjara.  The cases are analysed in depth through the use 
of news media and secondary data.  To verify the findings and to gain an experienced 
perspective on the issues, interviews were conducted with experts who have worked with this 
minority group and other minority issues in Georgia.  The theoretical framework of this 
research involves the concepts of democratization, particularly the concepts of democratic 
consolidation, majoritarian democracies, liberal/illiberal democracies, state strength, and 
pluralism.  The research findings conclude that all three of the hypotheses are interrelated 
causes of the cases in question.  The findings of the research indicate that the ultimate cause 
of the cases is Georgia being a weak state that is unable to function without the approval of 
the Georgian Orthodox church.  In addition to this, popular Turkophobia is used as a tool by 
opponents of the activities of the Georgian Muslim group.  It is revealed from the research 
that Georgia is in the process of democratization, and that it can be labelled as a majoritarian 
or illiberal democracy, because it lacks the state strength to implement the values of a liberal 
democracy.   
Keywords: Religious Minorities, Democratization, Majoritarian Democracy, Liberal 
Democracy        
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 Introduction 
Prior to the mid-2010s, few people around the world appeared to be aware of 
Georgia’s Muslim minority.  About 10 percent of Georgia’s population is Muslim, consisting 
of three different major groups; the Azeri minority in Kvemo Kartli, the Kists of the Pankisi 
Gorge, and the Muslim minority originating from Adjara1. This small population began to 
attract attention both nationally and internationally after several reported incidents of 
religious based conflict.  Violent protests occurred in response to a minaret being dismantled 
in the village of Chela, the nailing of a pig’s head to the door of a madrassa in the resort town 
of Kobuleti, and the ongoing fight for a second mosque in the city of Batumi.   All three 
incidents of violence against the Georgian Muslim2 population since 2012 seemingly 
occurred out of nowhere. Why religious clashes appear to have increased in the past decade 
is unclear.  One might assume this is due to the worldwide increase in Islamophobia, 
especially in Georgia, a Christian majority country surrounded by Muslim countries.  
However, human rights groups such as the Tolerance and Diversity Institute (TDI) and the 
Human Rights Education and Monitoring Center (EMC) have criticized the central 
government for their role in these incidents.  These groups claim the government is siding 
with the majority population and is not doing enough to help the Muslim minority.  Media 
coverage of the incidents have tended to be critical of the role of the powerful Georgian 
Orthodox Church, the religious institution followed by the vast majority of the Georgian 
population.  Right-wing politicians and news media blame the incidents on the increase of 
Turkish power in Georgia, citing Turkey’s desire to assert more influence or even annex 
Adjara.  Observations from this research suggest these incidents of religious conflict began 
to occur after the power shift in the Georgian Government from Saakashvili’s United 
National Movement (UNM) party to Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream (GD) party.   
 
1 Adjara has been written in the sources as “Achara”, “Adjaria”, and “Adjara” due to complications in the 
Latinization of the Georgian language.  In this research, the author choses to use the spelling “Adjara”.  
2 This research will use the term “Georgian Muslims” to refer to ethnic Georgians who practice Islam, mostly 
originating from the region of Adjara.  This is not to be confused with Georgia’s other Muslim minority 
groups such as Azeris or Kists.   
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Prior research done on the issues of the Georgian Muslim minority has focused on 
issues of their identity.  Being members of the dominant ethnic group, but a minority religion 
has caused a rift in the identity of the Georgian Muslim minority.  Additionally, broad 
research has been conducted in a quantitative manner concerning the rights of minorities in 
Georgia.  There has been little academic research done, however, investigating the causes of 
the issues surrounding the Georgian Muslim minority.  This research seeks to analyze the 
roles of all of the proposed culprits for the rise in tensions with the Georgian Muslim minority 
based on what NGO reports, news media, and local Georgians attribute to the rise in tensions 
with this minority.  This research will therefore look at each of these factors in order to 
understand the cause of the rise in tensions.   
The aim of this qualitative research is to explore possible origins of reported intra-
religious conflicts and the perceived increase in incidents of discrimination against the 
Georgian Muslim minority. The incidents in question have been carefully reviewed and the 
accuracy of media reports verified through interviews with subject experts.  Analysis of the 
research findings in their theoretical and historical context suggest three major factors 
influence the social environment in Georgia in which intra-religious conflicts may arise: the 
policies and attitudes of the Georgian Central Government and the Orthodox church, and 
popular Turkophobia.  Effective leadership and consistent application of national policies on 
human rights are crucial for the young Georgian Government to foster an environment of 
tolerance and continue on the path to building a liberal democracy.  
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Theoretical Framework 
The premise of this research is that the nation of Georgia remains committed to the 
process of becoming a liberal democracy, its chosen path upon independence from the Soviet 
Union.  Relevant key concepts and conditions within this framework are defined as 
democratization, state strength, liberal/illiberal/majoritarian democracies, and pluralism.  
These concepts are necessary for understanding the situation of Georgia as a new country on 
the road to democracy, and what the rise in tensions with the Georgian Muslim minority can 
reveal about Georgia’s path to democracy.     
Democratization 
For the purposes of this research, Georgia is described as undergoing a process of 
democratization in the form of what John Dryzek and Leslie Holmes calls “Democratic 
Consolidation” (Dryzek & Holmes, 2002) due to the fact that it became a democracy upon 
independence from the Soviet Union.  Democratization can be understood simply as the 
process by which a country becomes a democracy.  A Democracy is explained by Mucha as 
“A form of government in which it is recognized that ultimate authority belongs to the people; 
the people have the right to participate in the decision-making process and to appoint and 
dismiss those who rule” (Mucha, 2007).  This research uses Mucha’s definition of 
Democratization as “a process of transition from an undemocratic (authoritarian, totalitarian) 
to a more democratic system” (Mucha, 2007).  Mucha further explains that the transition is a 
very simple one, but the difficulty lies in the consolidation of democracy, as it can be very 
difficult to define the point at which the consolidation stage has been completed. Some say 
that consolidation is achieved when there are no longer major debates about the rules, but 
only under them, others are of the opinion that it is achieved when the new system has become 
"the only game in town" (Dryzek & Holmes, 2002). However, watching the developments in 
CEE, the opinion that appears most relevant is that "democracy is an ongoing interactive 
process, rather than some clearly defined end goal" (Mucha, 2007).  
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State Strength 
 States around the world vary in strength, or rather their ability to tend to the needs of 
their citizens.  Georgia is one state that has fluctuated greatly in strength in the past few 
decades.  Progress toward a strong democracy is dependent, in large part, upon the strength 
of the State.  Robert Rotberg explains that “Nation-states exist to provide a decentralized 
method of delivering political (public) goods to persons living within designated parameters 
(borders)” (Rotberg, 2003).  Rotberg Describes Political goods as  
those intangible and hard to quantify claims that citizens once made on sovereigns 
and now make on states. They encompass expectations, conceivably obligations, 
inform the local political culture, and together give content to the social contract 
between ruler and ruled that is at the core of regime/government and citizenry 
interactions (Rotberg, 2003).   
Examples of political goods include infrastructure, freedom from violence, and health care.    
Rotberg explains that these political goods can be used to measure the strength of a 
state:   
Strong states obviously perform well across these categories [of political goods] and 
with respect to each, separately. Weak states show a mixed profile, fulfilling 
expectations in some areas and performing poorly in others. The more poorly weak 
states perform, criterion by criterion, the weaker they become, and the more that 
weakness tends to edge toward failure, hence the subcategory of weakness that is 
termed failing. Many failed states flunk each of the tests outlined above (Rotberg, 
2003).   
This measure of state strength will be used in this research to define these categories of state 
strength.   
Liberal, Illiberal, and Majoritarian Democracies 
Just as there are different degrees of state strength, there are also different degrees by 
which states are democratic.  “Liberal Democracy” is defined by Fareed Zakaria as “a 
political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a 
separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and 
property” (Zakaria, 1997).  Liberal Democracy and Democracy have been understood in the 
west to be synonymous (Zakaria, 1997).  Because of this, the values of liberal democracy 
have been seen as what is expected as the norm.  As Christopher Hobson explains  
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A commonly observed feature of the post-Cold War world has been the ideational 
dominance of liberal democracy. Indeed, a characteristic aspect of the so-called 
'Velvet revolutions" that marked the beginning of this period in 1989 was their 
distinctly anti-utopian nature. No new political economic models were floated, as 
capitalist liberal democracy was widely accepted as the sole route to "normality". For 
some these cases reinforced a growing belief that democracy may truly be considered 
a "universal value," for others democracy had achieved its ascendant position almost 
by default, reflective more of the failure of alternative (Hobson, 2009).   
Georgians are no exception to holding the belief that a consolidated liberal democracy is the 
state’s ultimate goal, along with its fellow post-communist states.   
 If a liberal democracy is one that upholds liberal values, an illiberal democracy can 
be understood as one that does not.  Zakaria explains that there is a spectrum of illiberal 
democracies: 
Naturally there is a spectrum of illiberal democracy, ranging from modest offenders 
[…] to near-tyrannies […], with [other] countries […] in between. Along much of the 
spectrum, elections are rarely as free and fair as in the West today, but they do reflect 
the reality of popular participation in politics and support for those elected (Zakaria, 
1997)3.   
The concept of being an illiberal democracy is closely connected with the concept of 
democratization as “half of the ‘democratizing’ countries in the world today are illiberal 
democracies (Zakaria, 1997).  In other words, the state of being an illiberal democracy can 
be understood as being a transitionary step towards becoming a liberal democracy in the 
process of Democratization.   
 A majoritarian democracy is a form of an illiberal democracy. Although a 
majoritarian democracy may sound innocent enough given that democracies elect leaders 
based on a “majority”,  Aurel Croissant makes the distinction that “A majoritarian democracy 
is characterized by the principle of concentrated and unrestricted political power of the 
majority, whereas a consensus (liberal) democracy is based on the principles of power 
dispersion and limitation” (Croissant, 2002).  Majoritarian democracies do not dilute power, 
instead they function through acquiring a majority.  This runs into issues, however, in a 
 
3 This text has been shortened because the examples used by the author in the quote were outdated and are 
no longer relevant for the quote.   
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society where there are minority groups.  Arend Lijphart explains “the majoritarian model of 
democracy is inadequate for pluralistic societies because the flexibility necessary for 
majoritarian democracy is likely to be absent" (Lijphart, 1984). When access to power is 
permanently denied to minorities, majoritarianism can prove fatal.    
“As a consequence of their feelings of exclusion, minorities may withhold support 
from the regime and thus promote its demise” (Croissant, 2002).  Croissant continues by 
explaining the requirements for a majoritarian democracy to work:  
Two important conditions must be satisfied to make majoritarianism compatible with 
democratic consolidation: first, an alternation in power must occur to avert the 
emergence of structural minorities; and second, social cleavages and political 
polarization by way of an exclusion of minority interests from political decision 
making must not be reinforced by the split between political majorities and minorities 
(Croissant, 2002).  
Georgia is a culturally pluralist society, but does not meet these two conditions.  One of the 
values of a liberal democracy is equality and the protection of human rights.  This is difficult 
to maintain in a majoritarian democracy, and therefore this model of democracy fails in 
maintaining the values of a liberal democracy in a culturally pluralistic society.  It is ideal for 
a liberal democracy to acclimate itself to its minority situation in order to support its values.         
Pluralism  
The Oxford Dictionary defines Pluralism as “A condition or system in which two or 
more states, groups, principles, sources of authority, etc., coexist” (Oxford Dictionary, 2019).  
Pluralism can be further divided into different categories, for example, political pluralism, 
cultural pluralism, or religious pluralism.  The term “cultural pluralism” is important for this 
research and is defined as “A form of society in which the members of minority groups 
maintain their independent cultural traditions” (Oxford Dictionary, 2019).  That is, pluralism 
can be understood as the opposite of majoritarianism.  Given that a liberal democracy defends 
the rights of freedom of speech, religion, and expression, pluralism can be understood as 
essential to a liberal democracy.  A pluralistic society would be what Lijphart calls a 
“Consensus Democracy” (Lijphart, 1984).  “The consensus model [of liberal democracy] 
stands for governments supported by a broad range of diverse political and social groups. 
Although the consensus model does not abolish majority rule, it does aim at creating very 
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broad and oversized political majorities” (Croissant, 2002).  A consensus democracy is 
necessary in a culturally pluralist state such as Georgia to ensure the proper protection of 
Human rights as well as adequate representation.      
  
 8 
 
Background 
Overview of Georgian History 
Georgia is located in the South Caucasus along the Black Sea.  It is bordered by Russia 
to its north, Azerbaijan to its east, and Armenia and Turkey to its south.  The country is very 
mountainous, being wedged between the Greater Caucasus mountain range to its north and 
the Lesser Caucasus Range to its south.  It is an aspiring member of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the European Union.   
Pre-Soviet History 
The modern nation of Georgia was formed in its current state under the Russian 
empire in the 19th century.  Prior to this, the territory of present Georgia had been occupied 
by people groups speaking languages derived from the Kartvelian language family.  Today, 
Georgia is known as Sakartvelo meaning, “land of the Kartvelians”.  Throughout history, 
these groups were divided into different kingdoms and vassal states that fluctuated between 
independence, unions, and division through conquest.  This has created some historic, 
linguistic, and religious divisions among Kartvelian speakers that exist today.     
The primary characteristic uniting Georgians was their religion. Orthodox 
Christianity was brought to the country in the 4th century AD by a Cappadocian missionary, 
St. Nino.  After centuries of being conquered and divided among the Islamic Persian and 
Ottoman Empires, in the 19th century, the king of Kartli-Kakheti asked to become a 
protectorate of the Russian Empire, a fellow Orthodox empire.  Kartli-Kakheti, and later 
Imereti were annexed into the Russian Empire, and after the annexation of Adjara in 1878, 
modern Georgia took its shape.  National movements began in the latter half of the 19th 
century and the people of Georgia began to demand more autonomy from Russia.  After the 
February revolution in Russia, Georgia declared its independence from the Russian Empire, 
forming what is considered the modern state of Georgia.   
Modern History 
In 1921, the independent state of Georgia was overtaken by Bolshevik forces and 
became part of the Soviet Union.  As with most soviet states, Georgia was a diverse country 
whose borders were drawn based on the majority population, leaving many minorities within 
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its borders.  Given that Georgia had previously been part of the Russian empire, other ethnic 
groups from the empire lived in places like Tbilisi and Batumi.  This division resulted in a 
very large portion of Georgia’s population consisting of minority groups.        
As a Soviet Republic, Georgia went through soviet ethnicity policies wherein the 
ethnicities of republics were essentially created4.  This brought all different types of 
Kartvelian people under the umbrella of “Georgians” with a national dance, national food, 
language, flag, and so on.  Most importantly, this period defined the modern perception of 
what it means to be a Georgian (De Waal, 2010).  Religion was heavily repressed during 
soviet times.  Churches were closed and used as storage, clergy were sent to prison, and 
atheism was declared as the state religion.  No religion was spared from this in any of the 
Soviet Republics, effecting Christianity, Judaism, and Islam alike.   
During the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 80s and early 90s, Georgia was 
one of the first republics to declare independence after protestors were killed by Soviet troops 
on April 9, 1989.  The country elected Zviad Gamsakhurdia as their new leader, who declared 
independence from the Soviet Union in 19915.  Zviad Gamsakhurdia was very much a 
nationalist leader.  He often spoke against the minorities of the country, and his policies gave 
them little rights (Blauvelt & Berglund, 2016).  Gamsakhurdia was ousted in a coup in 1992, 
plunging the country into civil war. Coup supporters were fighting Gamsakhurdia’s 
supporters in Samgrelo as well as the separatists in Abkhazia, and even the capital was being 
fought over between the paramilitary forces of the coup leaders.  In order for their rule to 
 
4 The Soviet Union was portrayed not as a place where ethnic identity had ceased to matter but as a happy 
union of many discrete ethnonational groups collectively striving to create modern, classless nations that 
would eventually fuse into a single Soviet people. Over the seventy years of Soviet power, state policy on the 
nationalities question went through many different phases, at times highlighting the central importance of 
Russian language and culture, at other times stressing ethnic uniqueness. A constant theme, however, was 
the paradoxical—or, as Marxists would say, dialectical—union of ethnonational flourishing and cultural 
assimilation. The former had to do, first and foremost, with how basic questions of territory were decided 
(King, 2008). 
5As part of Gorbachev’s reforms in the late 80s, non-communist parties were allowed to run for office, 
resulting in Gamsakhurdia’s election as leader of the Georgian SSR.    
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gain legitimacy and for some stability, the coup leaders invited Eduard Shevardnadze to 
become president in 19956, restoring the position (Blauvelt & Berglund, 2016).  
  Shevardnadze was the former communist leader of Georgia during the Soviet Union 
and a praised negotiator abroad.  Shevardnadze was able to bring stability back to the country 
by ending the fighting and gaining the loyalty of regional leaders (Blauvelt & Berglund, 
2016).  In the late 90s, Georgia faced many problems.  Corruption was rampant, two of its 
regions were frozen conflicts7, and the leader of Adjara did not pay taxes to the central 
government (George, 2008).  People in the country lived in uncertainty and poverty as even 
electricity was rationed.   
As the population became weary of the corruption, crime, and poverty, a new figure 
arose beginning a movement to end corruption and bring democracy to the country.  Mikheil 
Saakashvili was educated in the United States and was a very pro-democratic, and pro-
western figure.  In November 2003, after fraudulent elections, he led a series of peaceful 
protests which led to the storming of parliament and the ousting of Shevardnadze in what was 
known as the “Rose Revolution”.  Saakashvili took power with his main goal being to 
strengthen the state, end corruption, and make Georgia a “true” democracy.  He was largely 
successful in this endeavor, drastically lowering corruption in the country, putting many 
corrupt officials and criminals in jail, and implementing many liberal reforms.  Saakashvili’s 
tactics, however, were very harsh.  Over time, jails became overcrowded, people lived in fear 
of speaking out against the government, and Saakashvili had given himself super-presidential 
powers.  In 2012, a new party led by the billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili won the elections, 
and in the first peaceful transition of power in Georgia’s history, the Georgian Dream party 
took power, vowing to become more open and democratic than Saakashvili.  The Georgian 
Dream party remains in power to this day.     
 
6 Eduard Shevardnadze was already the Speaker of the Parliament; the position of President had been 
abolished after 1992 and restored in 1995.   
7This refers to the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which were active conflicts during the 
early 90s, but had become frozen conflicts after ceasefire agreements were made during the late 90s.  
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Overview of Adjaran History 
Adjara is an autonomous region in the southwest of the country along the Black Sea 
and bordering Turkey.  It contains the country’s second largest city, Batumi.  Adjara was part 
of the Ottoman Empire for centuries, but was populated by ethnic Georgians.  Under Ottoman 
rule, the Georgian population converted to Islam and remained Muslim even after Adjara was 
reincorporated into Georgia under the Russian empire in the 19th century (Pelkmans M. , 
2002).  As part of the treaty of Kars in 1921 when the borders between Turkey and the Soviet 
Union were created, Adjara was made into an autonomous republic within the Georgian 
SSR8.  After Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union, Adjara maintained its 
autonomy (George, 2008).  Prior to 2012, there were few issues between the Georgian 
Orthodox and the Georgian Muslim population.  Adjaran Muslims lived in other parts of 
Georgia as well as Adjara.  Many of the Adjaran Muslims converted to Christianity, depleting 
the population of Adjara practicing Islam greatly (Pelkmans M. , 2002).  
Pre-Soviet History 
Adjara has a unique history as the Roman Empire settled this area.  Followed by the 
Romans, this area was the borderland of other empires like the Byzantines and the Ottomans.  
In addition to being coastal, the region is very rugged and mountainous.  The population is 
ethnically Georgian.  The region came under Ottoman control in the 16th century.  During 
Ottoman rule, while people were not forced to convert to Islam, noble families did so in order 
to gain prestige and avoid higher taxes.  Eventually, the majority of the population had 
converted to Islam and integrated into Ottoman society (Pelkmans M. , 2002).  In 1878, 
Adjara was ceded to the Russian empire which had already annexed the regions of Imereti 
and Kartli-Kakheti.  During this annexation, many Adjarans fled to Turkey in a process called 
the “Muhjaroba”, fearing poor treatment from a Christian power (Pelkmans M. , 2002).  
Adjara was united with the rest of Georgia under Russian rule.  During this time, the port of 
 
8 Largely to placate Turkish concern over the fate of Muslim minorities in the south Caucasus, the Bolshevik 
government agreed to special treatment for the Muslim areas of Achara and Nakhichevan even before Red 
Army units had marched into Georgia and Azerbaijan. Under the terms of the treaties of Moscow and Kars in 
1921, Soviet Russia and Turkey settled their border in the south Caucasus and agreed on the administrative 
status of these areas even though they lay inside what would become the Soviet Union (King, 2008). 
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Batumi became very industrialized (King, 2008) and Adjarans began to become more 
integrated into Georgian society.   
Modern History 
Like the rest of Georgia, Adjara experienced a brief time of independence before 
being incorporated into the Soviet Union.  Also like the rest of Georgia, Adjara came under 
the umbrella of Soviet ethnic policies which labeled them as “Georgians” rather than 
“Adjarans” (Pelkmans M. , 2006).  Under state adopted atheism, Islam was suppressed like 
Christianity.  Being on the border of the Soviet Union and a NATO country, Turkey, Adjara 
was heavily guarded (Pelkmans M. , 2006).  Adjara was given autonomous status as part of 
the treaty of Kars in order to protect the Muslim population there.  This was the only 
autonomous republic established on the basis of religion in the Soviet Union (King, 2008).  
After the fall of the Soviet Union, religion which had been confined to the private space, was 
able to move into the public space in Georgia as it was now embraced.  In other words, instead 
of practicing religion in secret, citizens were now able to express their religiosity publicly.  
Priests came to Adjara to try and convert the local Georgian Muslim population en masse.  
The patriarch even came to Batumi and performed a massive baptism of hundreds of 
participants (Pelkmans M. , 2002).  Once the borders were open between Adjara and Turkey, 
Turkish citizens, many of whom were descended from Adjarans that fled during the Russian 
empire, began to send aid to Islamic institutions in Adjara, sending funding for mosques, 
religious literature, and giving education to religious leaders (Pelkmans M. , 2002).   
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Autonomous Republic of Adjara was ruled by 
Aslan Abashidze.  Abashidze consolidated his power and became an authoritarian.  While 
Adjara did not fully separate from the rest of Georgia, Abashidze ruled the Autonomous 
Republic without the interference from the central government.  He did not pay taxes and 
ruled with impunity (George, 2008).  Adjara became a hotbed of crime, corruption, and 
smuggling.  After the Rose Revolution, one of Saakashvili’s first moves was to reincorporate 
Adjara and oust Abashidze.  Tensions increased between the two leaders and at the same 
time, Adjarans themselves began protesting Abashidze’s rule.  Sensing his end, Abashidze 
fled to Moscow and Adjara was reincorporated into the rule of the central government (De 
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Waal, 2010).  Saakashvili then transformed Batumi into an international port city and tourist 
destination.  He invited foreign investors into Adjara and the city began to rapidly change.  
Skyscrapers arose almost overnight, as did casinos and luxury hotels.  More and more tourists 
came to the city and the city entered an economic boom (Zviadadze, 2019).  Most of the 
influx of tourists and business owners came from Turkey, as well as Azerbaijan, and Russia.  
This rapid economic growth, however, created a large inequality gap, which locals came to 
blame the foreign entrepreneurs (Zviadadze, 2019).  Today Adjara is still an autonomous 
republic within Georgia and Batumi remains Georgia’s second largest city.   
Another important aspect of Adjara is that of its people and their identity.  Now that 
Adjara was freed from, the yoke of state-imposed atheism, the people were free to practice 
their religion.  Given that the Georgian Orthodox church was one of the major symbols of the 
Georgian nation, the power of the church began to flourish after independence.  The church 
began to acquire property taken by the Soviets, the clergy gained influence in politics, and 
people were allowed to attend mass without fear of persecution (Tolerance and Diversity 
Institute, 2014).  Just as Christians were fee to practice their religion, so too were the Muslims 
of Adjara.  Adjara was finally able to open communication with Turkey, where Imams could 
receive religious training, Islamic literature could be imported, and Muslim scholars could 
study.  Many Turkish citizens, most of Adjaran descent, began sending aid to Adjara in order 
to help Islam grow (Pelkmans M. , 2006).  This was met with controversy, however, as many 
Georgian Christians were not happy about Georgians practicing Islam.  This especially 
angered the church, which believed that Adjaran Muslims needed to “return to their 
ancestors’ religion”.  This created an identity struggle among many Adjarans which is talked 
about in Mathijs Pelkmans book Defending the Border: Identity, Religion, and Modernity in 
Georgia (Pelkmans M. , 2006).  Some Adjarans heeded this rhetoric and converted to 
Christianity, while others stood firm in their Muslim beliefs.  This is an identity issue with 
which Adjarans continue to struggle (Zviadadze, 2019).   
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Methodology 
The question of my research is “Why is there a conflict between Georgian Christians 
and Muslims?”  This research will be divided into three interrelated hypotheses that may be 
responsible for the conditions conducive to intra-religious conflicts Georgian Muslims and 
Orthodox Christians:  
1. The majoritarian nature of Georgian Democracy.   
2. The position of the Georgian Orthodox Church on Islam in Georgia.  
3.Popular Turkophobia, or the general fear of increasing Turkish influence in    
Adjara. (move over Adjara to line up under Popular)  
These hypotheses were chosen during the preliminary research.  These three causes 
are frequently attributed to the cause of the issue with the Georgian Muslim minority from 
previous research, media, and conversations with local Georgians.  They will therefore be 
tested simultaneously during the research.   
Although there have been conflicts between Georgian Christians and other minority 
religious groups, this research is restricted to conflicts with the Georgian Muslim group 
originating from Adjara.  This narrower focus permits an in-depth exploration of religious 
differences, avoiding extraneous differences in language and ethnicity found, for example, 
with the Azeri minority.  This research also focuses on Georgian Muslims rather than 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, Catholics, or other minority religious groups as conflicts with the 
Georgian Muslim group have been more common and more prominent.  
“Georgian Christians” refers to Georgians following the Georgian Orthodox Church, 
the dominant religious group in the country consisting of about 80% of the population.  The 
“conflict” between these groups refers to the phenomenon of the increase in seemingly 
discriminatory cases involving this minority group since 2012.  These issues include 
difficulties of the Georgian Muslims to build a mosque, clashes with the police over the 
dismantling of a minaret, the nailing of a pig’s head to the door of a madrassa, and several 
other issues. Finally, this research is intended to stimulate discussion of the ultimate questions 
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of the implications of these conflicts for Georgian society as a whole, and what they reveal 
about Georgia’s democratization process.   
The “issue” refers to the situation that the Georgian Muslim community finds 
themselves in when they try to bring an expression of their beliefs into the public space 
through building a mosque, a cemetery, or some other expression of their faith9.  In order to 
test the hypotheses, six cases of conflict were examined in detail.  These cases included those 
occurring in Nigvziani, Chela, Mokhe, Kobuleti, Batumi, and Adigeni.  Data gathered on 
these cases came from news media and secondary data from NGOs and public reports.  The 
data of these cases were compiled into detailed descriptions of these cases.   
Each of these cases are analyzed for characteristic patterns, which were verified by 
interviews with experts in this situation and could give unique insight based on experience 
and perspective. The interviews were conducted in order to verify my finding through 
comparing them with previous experts’ research and to gain insight on the situation from the 
perspective of exerts who have been working with minorities in Georgia for several years.  
Persons interviewed included Tatia Kalitozishvili - a faculty member at Ilia State University 
who has done anthropological research in Adjara (Appendix C); Eka Chitanava - the head of 
the Tolerance and Diversity Institute (Appendix A); Marina Elbakidze – a program head at 
the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy, and Development (Appendix B); and Sophie 
Zviadadze - a professor at Ilia State university who has done research on the Georgian 
Muslim minority of Adjara (Appendix D).  All interviews were conducted in English and 
covered various topics relating to answering the research question.  The interviews were 
semi-structured and covered topics including the research question, the interviewees’ 
particular area of expertise, and the interviewees’ particular opinion about the issue of the 
Georgian Muslims and how it can be solved.     
The limitations of this study are language and time. English is my native language. 
As my Georgian does not extend beyond a novice level, I am unable to conduct on-site field 
research and in-person interviews in Adjara or any of the villages where the case took place. 
 
9 The “Situation” of the Georgian Muslims will be the term used to refer to the overall issue religious based 
discrimination against this minority in Georgia.   
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The language barrier restricted written materials to English sources.  Additional time would 
also have been helpful, as the research involved exploring details of six different cases, each 
of which could have been approached as individual case studies.        
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Descriptions of Cases 
The following cases were carefully compiled into comprehensive descriptions using 
several different sources of data.  The descriptions were made in a comprehensive way and 
follow facts that were present in multiple data sources in order to maintain validity.  The 
following cases happened in separate villages and cities throughout Georgia and each case 
will be titled with the name of the village or city in which they occurred.   
Nigvziani 
Nigvziani is a small village in the region of Guria10, which borders Adjara to the north.  
During the 1980s, residents of Adjara were moved here as eco-migrants along with people 
from other regions of Georgia.  This was due to the high risk of landslides in the highland 
regions (Democracy & Freedom Watch, 2012).  Before 2012, there was no mosque in this 
village and the local Muslim population had to go to Kobuleti to pray.  To alleviate this 
commute, the local community purchased a house to be used as a place of worship (Georgia 
Today, 2012).  On October 25, 2012, tensions rose in the village Muslim residents marched 
through the village to the prayer house on the evening of an Islamic holiday.  Christian 
residents blocked the road to the house and tried to stop Muslim residents from praying there, 
threatening bloodshed if their actions continued (Georgian Journal, 2012).  Allegedly, there 
were people coming from other villages to this prayer house for the celebration of Eid al-
adha11 and this was interpreted by the Christian residents to be a demonstration (Vestnik 
Kavkaza, 2012).  Additionally, a rumor had spread that purchase of the house was being 
funded with Turkish money, which caused the local Christian population to react.  According 
to a local Muslim, “A Turkish citizen purchased a house and then sold it to a Georgian citizen 
because he could not use it. We opened a temple there. Anyone claiming that we did not have 
enough funds to buy the house is not correct. We collected the money and bought everything 
with our own money” (humanrights.ge, 2012).  This rumor resulted in a standoff between the 
local Muslim community and Christian community on November 2, as local Christians again 
 
10 The dominant group in Guria is Georgian Orthodox, and Adjarans that were moved here during the 1980s 
were placed in villages that mixed with Orthodox Georgians.   
11 Eid al-adha is the Muslim celebration of sacrifice.  It celebrates the culmination of the pilgrimage to 
Mecca.  It is a three-day celebration wherein animals are sacrificed and their flesh distributed throughout 
the community and is a time for visiting friends and family (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2019).    
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blocked the road, preventing Georgia’s chief Mufti12, Jemal Paksadze from entering the 
village (ecoi.net, 2013).  Escalating tensions caused opposition and NGOs to call on the 
government to launch an investigation into the situation.   
Stating its new strategy for religious disputes, the government stepped aside and gave 
responsibility over the situation to representatives of the Georgian Orthodox Church and 
Muslim leaders.  On November 5 , the Minister of Justice, Tea Tsulukiani, elaborated on this 
stating “When there is a conflict between the different religions, the state must provide a 
chance for them to solve the problem themselves rather than interfering directly…if there are 
reports of abuse, beatings or other violations of human rights, then the prosecutor’s office 
will launch the investigation process and get involved” (Georgia Today, 2012).  Tsulukiani 
explained that this new strategy was in response to the heavy-handed response by the previous 
government.  On November 7th, church members met with local Muslim leaders and agreed 
that the house would not become a mosque and that people from other villages would not be 
permitted to attend services there.  This agreement was in exchange for permission to operate 
the house as a place of worship (Democracy & Freedom Watch, 2012).  Quotes from locals 
interviewed reiterate the good relations that the two communities have and that “outside 
forces” were responsible for escalating the situation, possibly opposition candidates or agents 
from Turkey (humanrights.ge, 2012).  
Chela 
Chela is a village in the Adigeni district of the Samtskhe-Javakheti region. Its 
population consists of eco-migrants from Adjara and Racha, who were moved to this region 
from their highland regions due to a high risk of landslides.  Those from Adjara are primarily 
Muslim, while those from Racha are Georgian Orthodox Christians.  In 2008, the Muslim 
population converted a house into a mosque under protests by members of the clergy from 
the nearby monastery of Zarzma.  A group of about 150 people gathered to try and destroy 
the mosque, but this failed (Democracy & Freedom Watch, 2013).  The mosque was 
registered as a house and had no minaret.  In 2012, members of the mosque decided that a 
 
12 A Mufti is “A Muslim legal expert who is empowered to give rulings on religious matters” (Oxford 
Dictionary, 2019). 
 19 
 
minaret should be added.  Money was gathered by the Muslim community and a minaret was 
ordered from a company in Turkey (Democracy & Freedom Watch, 2015).  On July 14, 2013, 
the minaret arrived at the Georgian border with Turkey. No importation issues were 
anticipated.  A group of four Muslims from the local community went to the border to pick 
it up (Democracy & Freedom Watch, 2013).  The representatives, however, were admittedly 
unfamiliar with the importation process.  “We came with the documents. They indicated 
which cabin we should go to. We were not experienced with this process and didn’t know 
what to do, but listened to what they told us…Customs clearance finished without any 
problem, and at about 14:00 on July 14, we moved to Adigeni and arrived in Chela at 12:00 
at night” (Democracy & Freedom Watch, 2013).  
As the Minaret was being assembled, the local clergy from nearby Zarzma circulated 
a petition, gaining over 500 signatures, for the removal of the minaret (Democracy & 
Freedom Watch, 2013).  The revenue service notified the Muslim community that they must 
produce the proper paperwork for the materials used in the minaret.  On August 26, 2013, 
residents awoke to find the minaret being dismantled.  It is alleged that the revenue service 
began the removal before the 30-day timeframe that was given to the Muslim community 
(Democracy & Freedom Watch, 2013).  The revenue service stated that there was doubt about 
the proper declaration of materials on the customs form, resulting in a reduction of taxes.  
They claim that the minaret was to be dismantled for inspection and it would then be 
reinstalled at no further cost to the community (Ivanishvili, 2013).  As the minaret was being 
dismantled, the local Muslim community began to protest the dismantling, but were blocked 
on the bridge leading to the mosque by the police (Democracy & Freedom Watch, 2013).  
Eventually the protesters clashed with the police.  Twenty-one people were detained and 
taken to the police station in Akhaltsikhe, the regional center.  Multiple accounts by Muslim 
protestors were that they were physically and verbally abused by police (Democracy & 
Freedom Watch, 2013).  The arrest of protestors caused protests in front of the police station 
between August 26th and 27th, eventually the detainees were released with three being given 
criminal charges that were later dropped (The Jamestown Foundation, 2013).  Then PM 
Bidzina Ivanishvili paid for the release of the minaret from revenue service custody with his 
own money.  He then called upon leaders from the Muslim and Christian communities to 
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settle the dispute.  Members of the Muslims community who were involved in the 
construction were fined for illegal construction (The Messenger , 2013).   
On August 29th, the Patriarch of Georgia Ilia II met with Muslim leaders in Georgia 
and discussed the Chela incident with them. After the meeting, representatives of the 
Georgian Orthodox Church and Georgia's Muslim community made a joint statement and 
announced that in the interests of both sides, the minaret will be stored in neutral territory in 
the village of Chela13. The Patriarchate asked the government to reconsider its legislation on 
the construction of religious buildings. The minaret would remain stored until the legal matter 
is resolved (The Messenger , 2013).  The results of this decision caused protests on August 
31 by Muslim sympathizers in Batumi who were angry that the minaret was not immediately 
reconstructed as promised by the revenue service (Democracy & Freedom Watch , 2013).  
“When we were rallying in Batumi demanding to restore the minaret, the Patriarchate decided 
to seal the minaret, summoning Jemal Paksadze14 to sign this document. Afterwards, the 
priest in Zarzma stated that he is a guarantee that the minaret won’t be installed in Chela 
ever” (Democracy & Freedom Watch , 2013).  Protests also occurred in the municipal capital 
of Adigeni, where Christian protestors demanded a national referendum about whether or not 
there should be minarets in Georgia at all (REFworld, 2013).  When the minaret was being 
returned to Chela, Christians protested by blocking the road returning to the village.  “When 
we asked the protesters why they wanted the minaret to be taken away, they said that it was 
installed by Turkey with ‘broadcasting equipment’ inside it. They said it was the way for us 
[Georgian Muslims] to conduct clandestine communications with Turkey” (Democracy & 
Freedom Watch, 2016).  The issue became highly controversial and heavily covered in the 
media.  Official statements were released by the Patriarch as well as Ivanishvili.   
The Patriarch’s official statement blamed the escalation on unnamed outside forces 
and called on Muslim leaders to bring calm to their followers.  He further stated the 
importance of laws so that religious minorities would know the limit of their actions, stating 
that “The purpose of this effort is to somehow cause a clash between the Christian and 
 
13 This was a field 2km away from the boundaries of Chela (Democracy & Freedom Watch , 2013). 
14 Jemal Paksadze was the head mufti of AMAG during this time (Democracy & Freedom Watch, 2013). 
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Muslim populations, to discredit the Church and the state by this and to realize their goals 
against this backdrop” (Pravoslavie.ru, 2013).  The church then called upon Muslim leaders 
to control their constituents:  
We address the Muslim spiritual leaders who are living in Georgia with the request 
not only not to encourage these provocative actions, but also to oppose them in 
Adigeni as well as in other parts of Georgia. Today it all depends on you: the position 
of your flock regarding the law, the state interests and, of course, defense of religions 
(Pravoslavie.ru, 2013).   
Finally, the church reiterated the good relations between the two religious communities and 
called for the passing of legislation on religious issues.   
On our part, we have always striven and will not relax our efforts to strengthen these 
kind relations that we have not only with the Muslim leaders and the Muslim 
population in Georgia, but also with our neighboring Muslim countries and their 
spiritual leaders. And we consider that one requirement for this is an urgent 
investigation of the real reasons for these cases, identification of those persons who 
committed the unlawful actions, and who are interested in aggravating cases. At the 
same time an appropriate legislative base should be created, so that all would know 
the limits of their actions, so there will be no escalation of religious confrontation 
(Pravoslavie.ru, 2013). 
In essence, the church calls upon the government to put in place unspecified legislation in 
order to punished unspecified people who are aggravating the situation.   
Ivanishvili’s official press statement praised the history of religious tolerance in 
Georgia and reaffirmed the government’s stance on the freedom of worship.  He explained 
that the minaret’s disassembly was in order to verify the proper customs declarations.  He 
further pointed out that “Violations of the law occurred during the construction of the minaret, 
and the government cannot turn a blind eye to willfulness and unlawfulness” (Ivanishvili, 
2013).  He then reiterated his stance on religious issues by saying “When it comes to religious 
beliefs, the government must exercise extreme caution, as this is the most sensitive matter for 
adherents of any religion. Harmony and peace between religions has no alternative in our 
country” (Ivanishvili, 2013).  On September 4, however, Ivanishvili stated that “You can't 
behave like that, you come out of your house and there's a minaret there, with no prior 
agreement, no design plans, and the local authorities haven't been informed” (REFworld, 
2013).  In this way, he puts the blame on the Georgian Muslim community for the events.    
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In response, several NGOs released a joint statement criticizing the way that the 
situation was handled by Ivanishvili’s government.  “We believe matters could have been 
resolved without dismantling the minaret. Yet the revenue service opted for the crudest, most 
unacceptable of tactics” (REFworld, 2013).  Tamta Mikeladze of the Centre for Human 
Rights Education and Monitoring Center (EMC), also blamed the government for "using 
force against people in a negative way, taking a decision of questionable legality and 
proportionality, and offending people's religious sensibilities" (REFworld, 2013).  Others 
placed some of the blame on the Georgian Orthodox Church. The head of the center for 
Tolerance explains15: 
Representatives of the Patriarchate constantly refer to Muslims and also people of 
other faiths as enemies of the country and such like […] In 1992 and 1993, the 
Patriarchate stated that any Georgian who betrays Orthodoxy is an enemy of country 
and church. That discourse continues even now.  The Patriarchate called for calm, but 
it has pointedly directed its remarks at Muslims, not its own adherents (REFworld, 
2013).  
Other members of the church stated clear views against the construction of a minaret.  One 
church member stated: 
The village of Chela is a place where Georgians shed their blood in the fight for their 
Orthodox faith for centuries. The construction of a minaret in this historical village is 
insulting to us. It's Turkish expansion, it's an order from the European Union 
(Interfax-Religion, 2013).   
On November 28, 2013, the Muslim community was given an official permit to construct the 
minaret. Construction began immediately that evening under police supervision.  Priests 
allegedly arrived the next morning to protest, but nothing more happened beyond this 
(Agenda.ge, 2013).   
Batumi 
Batumi is the capital of the autonomous republic of Adjara.  As of today, Batumi only 
has one mosque, Orta Jami.  The economy of Batumi has grown in the past two decades.  
Because of this, there is an influx of Georgian Muslims from the mountainous regions of 
Adjara into Batumi (JAM news, 2017).  While talks of constructing a second mosque in 
 
15 The Center for Tolerance is branch of the Georgian Ombudsman’s office (REFworld, 2013).  
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Batumi have been happening for a long time, the problem became more urgent as more and 
more Georgian Muslims moved into the city.  The Orta Jami mosque became so overcrowded 
that Muslims were forced to pray in the street outside of Orta Jami (EMC, 2016).  
In 2009, a deal had been struck between Georgia and Turkey wherein Turkey would 
help finance the restoration of mosques on Georgian territory and in return Turkey would 
reconstruct Georgian Orthodox sites on Turkish territory (Democracy & Freedom Watch, 
2012).  This deal was widely unpopular and little information about it was transparent to the 
public.  It was speculated that the deal included restoration of a second mosque in Batumi 
that had been destroyed by the Soviet Union, the Sultan Azizye16 mosque which fueled anti-
Turkish sentiment.  This is elaborated in a report by OC Media: 
 In the eyes of many opponents to the mosque, Turkey is seen as an imperial power 
aiming to restore control over Adjara, if not politically, then by means of expanded 
business ties, promotion of Turkish culture, and weakening of Christian influences to 
facilitate the expansion of Islam. However, the Adjaran Muslims community has 
repeatedly denied that they want to construct a mosque on this location, especially 
considering the space has already been used (OC Media, 2017).   
This controversy caused outcry in Batumi, particularly from the Georgian Orthodox Church, 
which has remained steadfast in their opposition to the construction of a second mosque. 
Although the Patriarchate has never made an official statement on the issue, the local clergy 
in Batumi have repeatedly led rallies against the plan (OC Media, 2017).   
Several political candidates had promised the Georgian Muslims that they would see 
to it that a second mosque was built; Ivanishvili himself made this promise multiple times 
during his campaign (TDI, 2016).  In 2014, the Georgian Muslim community decided that 
enough was enough and officially appealed to the government, demanding the construction 
of a second mosque.  “In October 2014 the Administration of Muslims of All Georgia 
17(AMAG) wrote to the Prime Minister asking for the existing Mosque to be enlarged and 
 
16 The reconstruction of the Sultan Azizye mosque was controversial because it was seen as a symbol of 
Turkish imperialism.  The mosque was built by Sultan Aziz of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century to be 
used by the Ottoman military garrison in Batumi (Humanrights.ge, 2012). 
17 There is a lack of consistency among the sources as to the proper translation of this organization from 
Georgian to English.  The author has chosen to use the translation “The Administration of Muslims of All 
Georgia” in order to be consistent with the commonly used acronym “AMAG”.    
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restored, instead of building a new one. The document was signed by 23 persons” (ecoi.net, 
2015).  This would not have worked out however, because the Orta Jami mosque is a 
protected heritage site and expansion would have destroyed this heritage.   
In 2014, the State Agency on Religious Affairs, stated that the Georgian Muslim 
community didn’t want to construct a second mosque, but instead wanted a new residence 
for the mufti as well as a madrasa.  This is despite the fact that  “the Muslim community has 
made it clear that they need a second mosque, and it has become impossible for everyone to 
fit in the Orta Mosque and the streets surrounding it” (OC Media, 2017).  In January 2015, 
the State Agency of religious affairs with the cooperation of AMAG announced that the 
existing Batumi mosque would be enlarged to include a madrassa and offices for a Mufti and 
his staff.  These were officially opened on October 5, 2015 (ecoi.net, 2015).  This outcome 
angered many in the Georgian Muslim community.  
Two Georgian Muslims in Batumi, explained in an interview: "We are praying 
outside, sometimes in the rain and snow.  AMAG did not consider the needs of the Muslim 
community." (ecoi.net, 2015). Another Batumi Muslim confirmed this. "There is a big 
Muslim population. We need proper conditions to pray." (ecoi.net, 2015).  Frustrated, an 
initiative group was formed among the Georgian Muslim community for the construction of 
a mosque entirely purchased and built by the Georgian Muslim community (OC media, 
2018).  
In April of the preceding year, a controversial news report had been aired on the 
Rustavi 2 news network, where the reporter, attempting to show that a second mosque is 
unnecessary in Batumi, showed an empty mosque in the Khulo district to prove that the 
existing mosques are unused.  He further interviewed a very ill-informed history professor 
who claimed that this second mosque issue was being imposed on Georgia by Turkey and it 
was a form of encroaching Turkish power.  This was condemned by several NGOs for 
presenting misinformation and violating several broadcasting laws.  Rustavi 2 apologized and 
removed the broadcast (notophobia, 2015). By late 2016, the initiative group had gathered 
over 12,000 signatures on a petition for a new mosque; and on September 7th purchased a 
plot of land for the new mosque.  After appealing to the city council for a permit for the 
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mosque, a formal denial was given by the city on May 5, 2017 stating that the mosque could 
not be built because the land was in a residential area (EMC, 2017).  This ruling was 
considered discriminatory by several NGOs who pointed out the multiple churches in the area 
(Chitanava, 2019).  The Human Rights Education and Monitoring Center (EMC) noted that: 
In accordance with the regulations concerning the territory of Batumi municipality 
itself, in zone 6, apart from residential buildings, the construction of various objects 
of public purpose is also permitted, including “religious objects” for which, acquiring 
special (zonal) agreement is required from Batumi Municipality City Hall” (EMC, 
2017).   
The Georgian Muslim community constructed a makeshift structure covered by a tarp and 
declared the site “open for worship” on May 26th (JAM news, 2017).  In June 2017, with the 
help of the EMC and other NGOs, the Georgian Muslim community officially appealed the 
rejection and the matter was taken to court (OC media, 2018).  In April 2018, the government 
offered permission for the construction of the mosque under the condition that the land was 
given to AMAG.  Given the mistrust of the Georgian Muslim community in this organization 
and the belief that this was simply a means to freeze the issue, this deal was declined (OC 
media, 2018).  In April of 2019, over a year after the rejection for construction was appealed, 
the court case officially began (OC Media, 2019). Despite generating a great amount of media 
attention and stimulating an enormous controversy among Georgian society for several years, 
the Mosque issue remains unresolved.   
Mokhe 
Mokhe is a small village in the region of Samtskhe-Javakheti in the municipality of 
Adigeni.  The residents of this village are eco-migrants from Adjara who, along with 
Christians from Racha, were moved there in the 1980s because of the risk of landslides 
(Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 2014).  In 2014, a dispute emerged surrounding the 
ownership of a ruined building in the town.  The ruins were the roofless foundation of what 
was claimed to be either a mosque or a church.  According to a member of the Georgian 
Patriarchy, the site was a Georgian church in the 16th century, but was then converted into a 
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mosque by the Ottomans (Civil.ge, 2014)18.  According to the Muslim residents of Mokhe, 
the building was a mosque, built by Meskhetians between 1927 and 1934. The building fell 
out of use when the Meskhetians were deported to Central Asia in the 1940s.  The TDI 
interviewed a man from the village who confirms that the ruins were a mosque: 
A 74 year- old village elder retells his father’s account that his family used to go to 
the Mosque of Mokhe every Sunday from a remote Kikibo village, since it was the 
only mosque nearby. [The elderly man] also remembers that his grandfather sold a 
cow to donate for construction of the mosque. According to the local Muslims, this 
site had been functioning as a mosque until mass exile of the [Meskhetian Turks] was 
ordered by Stalin in the 1940s (TDI, 2014).    
Since 1957, the building was simply registered as a clubhouse until it was transferred to the 
Adigeni municipality in 2007 (TDI, 2014).  In May of 2014, the local Muslim community 
asked the local government to transfer the building to them.  Their request was postponed 
due to the elections.  On July 8, the Muslim community received a letter from the municipality 
head saying that as state property, the building could only be used for public needs (TDI, 
2014).  Resentment was especially high as when they were visited by Samtskhe-Javakheti’s 
governor together with Zakaria Endeladze, campaigning to be head of Adigeni district, and 
the chief mufti of Georgia respectively, they were promised the building. It never happened. 
After Endeladze was elected, he announced that the mosque’s present status as a cultural 
center could not be changed (Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 2014).   
On July 10, 2014, construction workers arrived at the building to begin demolition, 
but they were forced to leave because of protests by the local Muslim community, which, in 
turn, sparked a counter protest by the local Christian community (OC Media, 2017).  The 
construction workers returned to the site on October 22, 2014 accompanied by police, 
prompting a protest by the local Muslim community, which resulted in a clash with the police.  
Fourteen protestors were arrested resulting in three being released and 11 being charged a 
250 lari penalty, which is being contested by 10 of them (TDI, 2014). A 2015 report by 
 
18 This has not been proven to be true. 
 27 
 
Georgia’s Public Defender19 said that local Muslims complained about verbal and physical 
abuse from the police, who called them “Tatars”, a slur for Muslims. The report confirms that 
the protesters had signs of physical violence used against them. No official investigation into 
the case was opened. (OC Media, 2017). The association of Georgian Young Lawyers 
(GYLA) issued a statement saying:  
According to the witnesses, the police used physical force against detainees and made 
insulting remarks. Also, as the witnesses declared several detainees were severely 
beaten by the police. Among them was a woman, who received serious injuries on her 
face. According to local Muslims, the group of detainees also included young people, 
who intended to record the police action by their phone cameras, but their cameras 
were confiscated and destroyed (Civil.ge, 2014).   
This excessive response by the police and the government was highly criticized by human 
rights groups.   
After the confrontation, the State Agency of religious Affairs created a special 
commission to settle the dispute.  The commission consisted of four representatives of the 
Georgian Muslim community, three from the patriarchy, two from the local government, two 
from the cultural heritage protection agency, and one from the Agency of Religious Affairs.  
The local Muslim community strongly protested the composition of the commission as none 
of the three individuals they put forward to represent them were selected (OC Media, 2018).  
The goal of the commission was to determine whether the site was in fact a mosque or a 
church, using a team of archaeologists.   
The commission required almost three years to reach a verdict on the ruins, during 
which local Muslims began praying inside the ruins until 2016, when access was sealed off, 
prompting the Muslims to pray next to the ruins (Democracy & Freedom Watch, 2016).  In 
May 2017, the archaeologists determined that it was inconclusive as to which religion the 
ruins belonged.  Based on these findings, the government decided that the ruins would not be 
 
19 The Public Defender (Ombudsman) of Georgia oversees the observance of human rights and freedoms in 
Georgia. It advises the government on human rights issues. It also analyses the state’s laws, policies and 
practices, in compliance with the international standards, and provides relevant recommendations (ENNHRI, 
2017). 
 28 
 
transferred to either the local Muslims or local Christians.  The government then offered to 
build a separate mosque in the village, under the supervision of AMAG, while the site would 
be considered a disputed building under the supervision of the National Agency for Cultural 
Heritage Preservation (TDI, 2018).   
Mokhe’s Muslim community has refused the offer and continues to hold prayers in 
front of the old ruins. They have expressed dissatisfaction with the commission’s decision, 
believing it was an attempt to silence them (OC Media, 2017).  Nevertheless, construction on 
the new mosque began under the supervision of AMAG.  Throughout the construction, 
between 2017 and 2018, the Tolerance and Diversity Institute filed several lawsuits against 
AMAG for not releasing details about the construction of the new mosque.  It was revealed:  
On January 12, 2018 Akhaltsikhe District Court pronounced its judgment: sustained 
TDI’s request and ordered Adigeni City Hall to send information about the new 
Mosque to TDI. Accordingly, the City Hall has to officially notify TDI that the 
construction permit for building a new mosque in Mokhe has never been issued (TDI, 
2018).   
This could lead to potential legal issues in the future.  The local Muslims remain adamant 
and continue to pray next to the ruins.  In 2018, when the local Muslims continued to pray 
next to the blocked off ruins, the imam leading these prayers was dismissed by AMAG (OC 
Media, 2018).   
Kobuleti 
Kobuleti is a resort town just north of Batumi in the region of Adjara.  Tensions arose 
in mid- to late 2014 between the Christian and Muslim community.  A building, owned by 
Mustafa Buyuk, a Turkish citizen, was being rented by the leader of the organization known 
as “Relations of Georgian Muslims”.  Due to the overcrowding of the local madrassa20, of 
about 19 students, the house was to be converted into a second madrassa (Democracy & 
Freedom Watch, 2014).  The local Christian population protested this by constructing a 
barricade around the building, and guarded the building, preventing people from entering the 
 
20 A madrassa is “a Muslim school, college, or university that is often part of a mosque” (Merriam-Webster, 
2019). 
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premises (Human Rights House, 2014).  Local Christians were skeptical about the intent of 
opening a Muslim boarding school on a street inhabited by a majority of Orthodox families. 
They perceived the move as part of the “creeping Turkish expansion.”  Protestors that were 
interviewed claim a Turkish citizen paid 250,000 US dollars for the property and initially 
planned to open a hotel there (eurasianet, 2014). Locals say this fact should be taken into 
consideration.  A local Christian stated: 
You can purchase property in the prestigious districts of Batumi for 250, 000 -300, 
000 [US dollars]. Why did he buy a property in the narrow street of Kobuleti then, 
which is mostly inhabited by orthodox people? As an Orthodox person I protest it and 
believe the boarding school must not be opened here. They bring literature from 
Turkey but we do not know what kind of literature it is. It is impossible to control it 
because everything is closed and request the Ministry of Education to get interested 
in this fact. I hope Orthodox government of Georgia will assist us. Representatives of 
municipal board and government met [with] us and promised to help. I personally 
trust the God and nothing will happen without God’s Will (Human Rights House, 
2014).   
Protestors claim that the neighborhood is majority Christian and that this madrassa would 
become a hub of Islamic conversion for impoverished families in the region.  Locals claimed 
that the intention of the madrassa was to expand the Muslim population. Another local taking 
part in the volunteer Christian neighborhood patrol, describes prevailing thought on how 
Islamic boarding schools recruit students among poor Georgian families. According to him, 
these children are promised free secondary education and even free university education in 
Turkey. “And this is what attracts these families. Not everyone has money for their children’s 
education. But no real Christian will sacrifice their children’s faith for education. No, they 
better be uneducated, work the land, but stay Christians” (Democracy & Freedom Watch, 
2014).   
Tensions reached a peak in September 2014 when local Christian protestors harassed 
workers who were sent to work on the building, shouting insults and throwing rocks.  The 
head of Relations of Georgian Muslims explains:  
During the construction of a boarding school in summer, a certain group of locals 
constantly harassed them by preventing entry into the construction site or verbally 
insulting them. They complained to police, but the police didn’t react and said that 
there were no signs of crime in their actions (Democracy & Freedom Watch, 2014).   
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On September 10th, protestors slaughtered a pig on the grounds and nailed its head to the 
door; an insult, as pork is considered unholy in Islam.  The three perpetrators were found and 
charged with “petty hooliganism”, resulting in a fine of 100 lari each - about 35 US dollars.  
Allegedly one of the perpetrators was part of a local youth organization21 connected to 
Georgian Dream, the ruling party (Democracy & Freedom Watch, 2014).  Human rights 
NGOs condemned this incident and stated that these individuals should be charged under 
Georgian Criminal code 156, which states people cannot be persecuted for exercising the 
right to free speech (Democracy & Freedom Watch, 2014).  NGOs also pointed out the lack 
of intervention by the local authorities in this situation. Action was taken only after the pig’s 
head was nailed to the madrassa door.   
Even then, protests did not subside.  Locals continued to maintain a makeshift barrier 
in front of the madrassa, which has yet to be opened.  This barrier is decorated with banners 
and Orthodox Christian religious icons.  Only one individual lives there, a local law student 
from Batumi (Humanrights.ge, 2015).  The public defender’s office accused the local 
authorities of discrimination on three separate occasions (OC Media, 2018).  The most recent 
of these was in October of 2018, when the Georgian court ordered water be supplied to the 
facility, which remained unopened.  In response to this, the local authorities stated that they 
have tried several times to supply water to the building, but were stopped by locals (OC 
Media, 2018).  This provision of water remains unsolved at the time of writing.  Negotiations 
between religious leaders from the Georgian Orthodox Church and the Georgian Muslim 
community have been attempted, but have so far been unsuccessful (Transparency 
International, 2014).  The PM at the time released a letter about the incident praising 
Georgia’s multiculturalism and blaming “outside forces” for the escalation in tensions 
(Humanrights.ge, 2015).  Human Rights NGOs were particularly vocal about the incident, 
with several of them releasing a joint letter in which they blame the government for a lack of 
action.  Among the accusations, they include: not treating the pig’s head incident as 
discrimination, not doing more to open the school, being loyal to the dominant group instead 
of protecting the minority, a lack of police presence, non-transparent negotiations, and no 
 
21 The name of this organization is not given by the source. 
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removal of the makeshift barriers (Democracy & Freedom Watch, 2014).  Finally, the church, 
while it condemned the pig’s head incident as Islamophobic, stated that the madrassa should 
not be opened because of it being against the will of the local people (Democracy & Freedom 
Watch, 2014).               
Adigeni 
Adigeni is the main town of the municipality with the same name in the region of 
Samtskhe-Javakheti22.  As with several towns and villages in the district, many of its residents 
are eco-migrants who were moved from both highland Adjara and Racha in the 1980s due to 
a risk of landslides.   Issues in this religiously diverse community began in 2015, when a man 
named Revaz Mikeladze, a local Muslim, died. His relatives wanted to bury his body in a 
spot in the town other than the local Christian cemetery.  The local community authorities 
refused permission, and he was buried in the nearby town of Zanavi.  The issue was that 
Christian cemeteries in Georgia violate multiple Islamic traditions; several crosses are on the 
site, images of the deceased, and the community frequently brings alcohol onto the premises 
as part of Georgian Orthodox tradition23. 
Revaz Mikeladze’s death sparked a debate among the local Muslim community about 
creating a separate cemetery in Adigeni after Mikeladze’s family proposed a suitable plot in 
the village (JAM News, 2016).  The proposal for a separate Muslim cemetery upset the local 
Christian community. They saw no need for one.  Tensions reached a peak on February 29, 
2016, when a verbal confrontation began about the issue between local Muslims and local 
Christians.  In response to this, the municipality head came to the town that evening to meet 
with the local Muslim community in the street (Civil.ge, 2016).  During the discussion, the 
local Muslims were harassed by young men from the local Christian community whom had 
apparently been under the influence of alcohol.  The confrontation ended with three of the 
local Muslims being injured and no arrests.  This caused a two-day standoff between the local 
 
22 Regions of Georgia are sub-divided into Municipalities, which normally take the name of the largest town 
in them.    
23 While Alcohol is prohibited in Islam, there are several public and private holidays in Georgian Orthodox 
tradition, where friends and family return to the graves of deceased individuals to feast, which includes 
alcohol.  Furthermore, images of humans are forbidden in Islam, while in Georgian Orthodox communities, it 
is common to adorn an individuals’ grave with their portrait.   
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Muslim and local Christian community wherein the police were called in to contain the 
situation (JAM News, 2016).  The government chose to distance itself from the situation and 
called upon local religious leaders to settle the dispute.  After two days, they reached an 
agreement that new ground adjacent to the current cemetery would be given to the local 
Muslim community.  It would have a separate entrance and would be separated from the 
Christian cemetery with a line (JAM News, 2016).  An investigation was launched into the 
cemetery case, wherein six people were fined 100 lari for “swearing and scolding in a public 
space, insulting citizens and other administrative offenses” (Democracy & Freedom Watch, 
2016).  An investigation was also launched to pursue criminal code 156, protecting 
individuals from persecution based on their freedom of expression, but nothing came of this 
(Democracy & Freedom Watch, 2016).   
Human Rights lawyers said that the decision was ‘unlawful’ and ‘unfair.’ There were 
signs of violation of the Criminal Code.  The lawyer of the local Muslims said that his clients 
should be recognized as victims, however, the prosecutor rejected their claim to victim status.  
Gaining his clients victim status would reopen the case (Democracy & Freedom Watch, 
2016).  NGOs and the Georgian Muslim community criticized the situation, asking why the 
government head did nothing while the local Muslims were attacked and why the government 
gave responsibility of the negotiations to religious leaders (Civil.ge, 2016).  Local Christians 
say that they were afraid that a mosque would follow if they allowed a separate cemetery, as 
one Christian resident explains: 
There is no place for a Muslim cemetery in our village. Being Orthodox Christians, 
we firmly insist on it and will not let anyone do anything! There is another cemetery 
in the village, so let them bury their dead there. If allocate a separate area, they will 
build a mosque there later, ‘- says Tina Janashia, an Orthodox Christian resident of 
Adigeni village (JAM News, 2016).   
The Georgian Muslim community said that local police often encourage violence against 
them. The head of the Georgian Muslim’s Union believes that the government inspired the 
conflict in Adigeni. He questions why the administrative head of Adigeni was passively 
standing by while local Muslims were beaten in front of him. “He also claims that the head 
of the local police department has made disparaging remarks about Georgian Muslims and 
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actually encourages inter-religious tension” (Democracy & Freedom Watch, 2016).  The 
government, reiterated Georgia’s multiculturalism and blamed “outside forces” for 
encouraging the unrest (Democracy & Freedom Watch, 2016).    
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Findings: Factors Influencing Muslim/Christian Relationships  
To restate the research hypothesis, three major factors appear to be relevant to both 
the origins and resolution of Georgian Muslim/Christian conflicts in Georgia: the 
attitudes/policies of both the central government and the Georgian Orthodox Church, and 
popular Turkophobia.  The following sections are patterns that are prevalent through analysis 
of the descriptions of the cases.  Each of the three hypotheses are prevalent throughout each 
of the cases.  It should be noted that each of the cases occurs when members of the Georgian 
Muslim community attempt to express their beliefs in the public space through construction, 
or attempted construction, of a religious site such as a mosque, madrassa, or cemetery.  Also, 
in each of the cases, it should be noted that community members are eager to express their 
approval of multiculturalism and good relations between the two communities.       
The Georgian Central Government 
  The government’s response to Georgian Muslim/Christian conflicts will be organized 
into three major categories: The Hands-off approach, Down-playing the issue, and Poor 
Implementation of Protections.  The Hands-off approach refers to the way in which the 
government avoids becoming involved in disputes and instead gives authority to religious 
leaders to solve the situation  Down-playing the issue refers to the way in which the 
government either ignores the problem, or use one of the organizations loyal to them to 
quietly reduce the controversy.  Poor implementation of protections refers to the inadequate 
minority protections available to the population.     
The Hands- Off Approach: Nigvziani, Mokhe, Chela, and Adigeni  
In several of the cases, the government takes a “hands-off approach” meaning that it 
gives the authority over resolving the conflicts to religious leaders rather than to government 
officials, because it is considered a “religious issue”.  The religious leaders have discussions 
without involvement of representatives from the central government or human rights groups 
and the conclusions of that discussion is accepted by the central government.  The hands-off 
approach best characterizes the government’s approach in Nigvziani, Chela, Mokhe, and 
Adigeni.  It is important to note that each of these villages is located in a region outside of 
Adjara, where residents are eco-migrants from Adjara, living alongside fellow eco-migrants 
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from Christian parts of Georgia.  The result is a religious division in the villages between 
Georgian Christians and Georgian Muslims.   
Nigvziani was the earliest instance of discrimination against the Georgian Muslim 
community after the election of the new government in 2012.  After tensions rose in the 
village, Prime Minister Ivanishvili, and several other politicians from the newly elected 
Georgian Dream party stated the importance of the government staying out of religious 
issues.  Ivanishvili’s government stated:  
When there is a conflict between the different religions, the state must provide a 
chance for them to solve the problem themselves rather than interfering directly[…]if 
there are reports of abuse, beatings or other violations of human rights, then the 
prosecutor’s office will launch the investigation process and get involved (Georgia 
Today, 2012).  
This approach was chosen in order to differentiate itself from the previous ruling party United 
National Movement, which was noted for its “heavy handed approach”.  Religious leaders 
from the patriarchy and the Georgian Muslim community met over the issue of the prayer 
house and they agreed that the house would not be converted into a mosque and that people 
would not come to worship there from other villages, all of which violates the rights of the 
Georgian Muslim population.      
After the minaret in Chela was dismantled and kept by the revenue service, protests 
broke out, several Georgian Muslim protestors were arrested and there were many reports of 
abuse.  Tensions were very high between Georgian Muslim and Christian communities at this 
time, with protests appearing in other places, such as Batumi.  In order to ease tensions, PM 
Ivanishvili paid to get the minaret out of custody with his own money, and a council was 
called among religious leaders (Eurasianet, 2013).  This council decided that the minaret 
would be returned to Chela for investigation, but would be under the supervision of the 
patriarchy, more specifically the priests from nearby Zarzma monastery (Georgia Today, 
2013). This was highly criticized by the Georgian Muslim community, who questions why 
the patriarchy was even involved in the situation as well as Human rights groups who call 
this a “preservation of the issue” rather than a solution.  Furthermore, it should be noted that 
in spending his own money to get the minaret out of custody, Ivanishvili acted as an 
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independent citizen, rather than a government agent24.  The central government did not get 
involved in the situation it instead “chose to distance itself from the rift saying the religious 
leaders from both sides should solve their problems without the state’s involvement to 
guarantee a better solution” (Georgia Today, 2013).   
The case of Mokhe was another example of how the state transferred responsibility 
of the situation to local leaders.  When the local Muslim community wanted to convert the 
ruins into a mosque, the church claimed the ruins were formerly a church, and should 
therefore be given to the church.  Rather than granting the local Muslim community’s request 
initially, government inaction allowed the situation to grow and was then handed over to 
religious leaders.  The commission formed to determine the fate of the ruins consisted of 
religious leaders, representatives from the cultural heritage preservation, and one member 
from the state agency of religious affairs, an organization considered to be a government 
puppet, rather than an entity that preserves human rights.  The local Muslim community had 
no representation chosen by them (OC Media, 2018).  Once the commission determined that 
the ruins should not be given to either side, the state determined that the ruins would be 
designated a “disputed site”.  This ruling has been condemned as “conflict preservation” by 
human rights groups, and has not been accepted by the Georgian Muslim community. 
The case of the Adigeni cemetery is yet another instance where the government did 
not get involved.  When tensions began to rise among local Muslim and local Christian 
communities, the government used local mediators to solve the problem.  Although the 
church had no prior involvement, the government called upon the patriarchy to meet with 
local Muslim leaders to solve the issue.  After about two days of tensions, an agreement was 
reached between religious leaders that the cemetery would have an adjacent section for 
Muslims.  Furthermore, after members of the local Muslim community were attacked, an 
investigation was launched, which resulted in no arrests, despite the fact that the incident was 
witnessed by several people.  When the perpetrators were identified, they were given a 
 
24 Bidzina Ivanishvili is a Georgian Billionaire who is the figurehead of the Georgian Dream party, which he 
established and funded himself.  The Georgian Dream party is seen as his party, rather than as an 
independent political party.   
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minimal fine for hooliganism, rather than being charged with a hate crime.  Local authorities 
and police also notably did nothing during the violence and the protests.     
Down-playing the Issue: Mokhe, Batumi, Chela, and Kobuleti 
In the following cases, the government does not recognize the issues as a human rights 
issue.  According to NGOs and Human Rights groups, these cases are human rights issues 
because they are obstructions of a religious minority’s right to freely worship.  What can be 
observed in the cases, however, is that the government does not treat these issues as such, 
and they are treated as isolated incidents or religious disputes that can be solved by religious 
leaders.  Furthermore, the government uses tactics to cover up the issue through the use of 
compliant state organizations, and minimizing the issue.   
Puppet Organizations  
The State Agency of Religious affairs and the Administration of Muslims of All 
Georgia are both mistrusted organizations that face criticism by the Georgian Muslim 
community and Human Rights groups for their failure to represent the Georgian Muslim 
community.  These organizations frequently become involved in disputes, but their responses 
are considered by the community as simply extensions of the government’s will and therefore 
ineffective.  The State Agency for Religious affairs is a government organization responsible 
for protecting the rights of religious communities, but has been highly criticized for their 
failure to investigate incidents of conflict as human rights issues and punish violators for hate 
crimes.  Even more mistrusted is the Administration of Muslims of All Georgia (AMAG), a 
non-governmental organization, but one that is not completely autonomous from the 
government (Caucasian House, 2016).  AMAG, as it is often referred, is largely seen as 
nothing more than the government’s way of controlling the Muslim community as the 
majority of their funding goes to the salaries of the state appointed mufti (Caucasian House, 
2016).  The inefficiency and mistrust of these organizations can be seen in the issues of the 
Batumi mosque and in Mokhe, among others.  
In the case of the Batumi mosque, AMAG sent a letter to the government stating that 
it would be better to pay for a new home for the mufti and the restoration of an unused 
madrassa rather than build a second mosque.  Given the large number of Georgian Muslim 
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citizens in Batumi asking for a mosque, this is very much against the will of the community 
that this organization was meant to represent.  Furthermore, when the government offered to 
allow a mosque to be built if it was put under the control of AMAG, the Georgian Muslim 
community opposed this solution due to the mistrust of the organization.   
Another situation in which AMAG’s involvement was ineffective was the case of the 
Mokhe ruins.  After the ruins were considered “disputed” the government offered to build a 
mosque in Mokhe under the supervision of AMAG.  Despite this decision being rejected by 
the Georgian Muslim community, AMAG went ahead with the mosque construction.  In a 
report released by the TDI, after making several inquisitions about the construction of the 
mosque, it was determined that the mosque was being built without a construction permit, 
which could cause problems in the future (TDI, 2018).   
Minimizing the Issue 
Another tactic used by the government is to minimize the issue so that it appears as 
an isolated incident, rather than a systemic problem.  This is done through blaming of 
unnamed “outside forces” for the increase in tensions, the neglect of claims of human rights 
abuse, and the general ignoring of the situation.  In almost all of the cases, the increase in 
tensions between the Georgian Christian and Muslim communities is blamed on “outside 
forces”, which are never specifically named.  It is sometimes implied that opposition 
candidates spark tensions, or possibly Turkish or Russian agents, again without being named.  
These tactics are used by government and church officials, and spokespersons being 
interviewed in the cases.  Outside forces are blamed and the “good neighborly relations” 
between local Muslims and local Christians are highlighted.  Another tactic of not 
acknowledging the problem is through failing to charge those responsible for attacks on 
Georgian Muslims with hate crimes, more specifically, Article 156, wherein citizens cannot 
be prosecuted or punished for exercising their freedom of speech (Criminal Code of Georgia, 
1999).  This can be seen in the cases of Kobuleti, Adigeni, Kobuleti, and Chela.   
In Kobuleti, only after a pig’s head was nailed to the door of the madrassa was an 
investigation launched by the police.  The perpetrators were found and charged with 
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hooliganism, resulting in a 100 lari fine, about 34 US dollars.  Human rights groups argue 
that they should have been charged with a hate crime, but this has not happened.     
In the case of Adigeni, members of the local Muslim community were physically 
assaulted, with three people being injured.  The perpetrators of this incident were also only 
charged with hooliganism and charged a small fine.  TDI has argued that this is not a fair 
punishment, but the case cannot be reopened since the verdict was given, they are instead 
pursing “victim status” for the injured Georgian Muslims in order to reopen the case. 
In both Mokhe and Chela, protests erupted into violence as local Muslim protestors 
clashed with police.  In both of these cases, protestors were arrested, and made claims of 
abuse by the police.  In both of the cases, these claims of abuse by police have been ignored. 
In the protests that erupted into violence in both Mokhe and Chela, Georgian Muslim 
protestors were arrested and others reported both verbal and physical abuse by police.  Rather 
than launching an investigation, the local Muslim protestors were blamed by police and the 
government for inciting violence.   
Finally, in cases where tensions were high, police simply did not respond.  In Kobuleti 
namely, when local Christians prevented people from entering the madrassa and set up a 
makeshift barrier, police did not disperse the protestors or take down the barrier.  In not 
pursuing claims of human rights abuse, the government minimizes conflict issues by 
preventing it from being labeled a human rights issue, religious issue, or any large issue that 
exists in Georgia.  Intra-religious conflict issues are instead labeled as isolated incidents, with 
no patterns occurring among them.       
 Poor Implementation of Protections  
Another pattern that is prevalent throughout the cases is the lack of protections 
exercised to protect the rights of the Georgian Muslims and the lack of representation of the 
Georgian Muslim community.  Representation of the community occurs in the form of 
religious leaders, some of whom are not chosen by the community to represent them, like in 
the case of Mokhe.  There are articles in the Georgian constitution that protect religious 
minorities’ rights to free speech, rights to worship, and rights to own property.  The issue, 
however, lies in their implementation.  When a need arises in a Georgian Muslim community, 
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for example, rather than being guaranteed or fought for within the government, the issue 
becomes politicized as politicians debate about what Human Rights groups argue should be 
a given right.  Additionally, some politicians manipulate the issue into a means of acquiring 
votes, like in the cases of Batumi and Mokhe.  The pattern that occurs in all of these cases 
are due to improper implementation of constitutional protections and true representations.  
As a result, the Georgian Muslim community must fight for their rights at a grassroots level25.   
Issues of Acquiring Property: Mokhe, Batumi, Adigeni  
As can be seen in the cases of Batumi, Mokhe, and Adigeni, one of the major patterns 
is the difficulty of the Georgian Muslim community to acquire property.  When the 
community attempts to reconstruct ruined property, or purchase land for a new building, they 
are faced with several obstacles preventing them from doing so.  It is difficult for religious 
organizations in general in Georgia to acquire property26.  The Georgian Orthodox Church, 
however, is able to acquire property practically for free (1 lari or 0.34 US dollars) as part of 
a soviet legacy law, whereas other religious minorities are unable to do this.  This is explained 
in a report by the Tolerance and Diversity Institute:  
“Pursuant to the Law of Georgia on State Property, the state property may be acquired 
by natural or private law legal persons and ‘in case of direct sale based on the decision 
of the Government – Georgian Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church, as well’. 
In practice, this means that no other religious organization, registered as legal entity 
under public law can acquire the state property through the procedure of direct sale, 
except for the Georgian Orthodox Church, which benefits from the specific exception, 
made exclusively for it. As an additional security, it is underscored in that same 
Article, that the Orthodox Church is entitled to privatize for free the agricultural land 
owned by the State. The same guarantee is provided in Article 11 of that law, which 
again declares the Georgian Orthodox Church as the owner of all the agricultural land 
under its usage” (Tolerance and Diversity Institute, 2014). 
What this means is that the Georgian Orthodox church is given a special status held by no 
other minority religion in the event of acquiring property.  Since a religious organization 
cannot register as a legal entity, it cannot acquire property.     
 
25 A “grassroots level” refers to the civil society sphere, wherein the will of the community is expressed 
through unorganized protests, and civil society organizations that are created from the ground up, rather 
than from the government.   
26 The Georgian Muslim Community is considered a religious organization. 
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In the case of Batumi, the Georgian Muslim community, tired of hollow promises by 
politicians, tried to purchase a plot of land through community donations and the formation 
of an initiative group.  Their construction request was denied due to the area being considered 
residential despite the fact that there were several churches in the area.  After the community 
fought this, an offer was made for the land to be brought under the umbrella of the 
government by transferring it to AMAG.  The process remains an ongoing fight for the 
construction of a second mosque in Batumi.     
In the case of Mokhe, despite having a claim to the ruins of the former mosque, the 
issue became unresolved and the dispute frozen.  As explained by the TDI, it is extremely 
easy for the church to re-acquire property that was taken by the state during the soviet era.  
This is despite the fact that religious buildings in Georgia were taken from other religious 
groups as well.  As the TDI explains: 
In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Georgian Patriarchate regained 
its ownership on religious buildings. However, among the buildings handed over to 
the Patriarchate were those that were historically owned by other religious 
organizations existing in Georgia. Also, those religious buildings of various purposes 
that were confiscated during the Soviet period but did not serve Orthodox Christian 
purposes and were owned by the state or private parties (such as theaters, gyms, dance 
halls, library, etc.) remain unreturned as well (Tolerance and Diversity Institute, 
2014).   
While a new mosque was built by AMAG, the issue remains that the community was unable 
to reconstruct a building even though they had a claim.   
Finally, in Adigeni, when the local Muslim community wished to create a separate 
cemetery, they were ultimately denied this request.  The situation was able to avoid any 
violence or a long civil society battle, but the community was still denied their right to have 
a separate cemetery in the village.  While all that is required for the government to give the 
church a piece of land is a simple request from the church.                   
Politicization 
One issue that is frequently pointed out by Human Rights NGOs is how these cases 
are debated in the political sphere.  When a case occurs, debates occur between politicians 
over whether or not the Georgian Muslims should be allowed to do what NGOs consider to 
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be their human rights.  This can be seen in the case of the Batumi Mosque.  The very question 
of whether or not the Georgian Muslim minority should be allowed to build a house of 
worship was debated upon by politicians.  Groups such as the TDI and EMC argue that this 
is a human right guaranteed to the Georgian Muslim minority in the constitution and this 
should not be a debate between politicians over whether or not it should happen.   
Furthermore, these cases have been manipulated by politicians as a means to acquire 
votes (Zviadadze, 2019).  In regions where there is a large Georgian Muslim community, 
most notably Batumi, Adjara, and Samtskhe-Javakheti, some politicians have used the 
situation of the Georgian Muslim minority as a tool in their political campaign.  Claims from 
politicians have ranged from calling them “loyal to Turkey” to promises that the needs of the 
community will be met.  In the majority of the cases, political overtures toward the Georgian 
Muslim community turn out to be political rhetoric. 
This can be seen in the cases of Mokhe and Batumi.  In Mokhe when a politician 
running for municipal office promised the community that he would ensure that the ruins 
would be transferred to the local Muslim community.  After he was elected, the ruins were 
not transferred and plans to convert them into a public building commenced.  In Batumi, the 
case of the second mosque became highly politicized and were central topics on several 
parliamentary debates.  Several politicians including Georgian Dream leader Ivanishvili 
promised that the mosque would be built, but this did not happen.  So frequently were hollow 
promises made to the community that they lost their trust in the government and began to 
build the mosque through their own initiative.   
Unpunished Rights Violations 
Human Rights groups point out how the lack of punishment for the abuses of the 
rights of the Georgian Muslim community “opened the flood gates”27 for further abuses.  In 
cases where Georgian Muslims are prevented from worship, or where hate crimes occur 
 
27 “It has begun in Nigvziani, then continued in Samtatskharo, Tsintskharo and then in Chela […] It is the 
result of local governments and law enforcement not responding to the problem adequately. If the 
government had made some repressive steps to solve the problem in Nigvziani, the process would have 
stopped” (Democracy & Freedom Watch, 2015). 
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against them, the perpetrators are not appropriately punished.  It is then left to Human Rights 
organizations to stand up for the rights of the Georgian Muslim population in asking for 
harsher punishments against perpetrators.       
Nigvziani was the first example where people were not punished for their 
discriminatory activities.  When local Christians blocked the local Muslim community from 
worshipping at a prayer house, a clear violation of the community’s right to worship freely, 
no one was punished.  Furthermore, Christian protestors blocked the Mufti from entering the 
village and no one was punished for this.  In the end, the local Muslims ended up with the 
inability to build a proper mosque and the inability for outsiders to worship in this mosque, a 
violation of the right to worship.   
In Adigeni, when members of the local Muslim community were attacked, the 
perpetrators were also only fined for hooliganism.  After the verdict was given, the case could 
only be reopened if the victims were given “victim status”28.  The only punishment that these 
perpetrators received was a small and affordable fine.  This is all despite the fact that the head 
of the municipality was a witness to the attack.   
In Kobuleti, when a pig’s head was nailed to the door of a madrassa, an insult in Islam, 
this was not punished as a hate crime, but as petty hooliganism.  Furthermore, the local 
government did not connect water to the madrassa, leaving the building unusable.  The central 
government had to order the mayor’s office of Kobuleti several times to connect the water to 
this building.  The most that the central government could do in this situation was to consider 
it discrimination.  The framework for protection for the rights of religious minorities exists 
to an extent.  This is not adequately implemented however, in the cases mentioned above.  
 
 
 
28 Now, the lawyer is trying to grant have his clients recognized as victims. The prosecutor rejected their 
claim to victim status, but the lawyer appealed the prosecutor’s decision to the chief prosecutor and now 
they are waiting for the response. Even though the case is closed, it is still possible to get victim status and 
reopen the case (Democracy & Freedom Watch, 2016). 
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Lack of Representation   
One of the major reasons for inadequate protections for the rights of the Georgian 
Muslim community is the lack of representation for them in the central government.  While 
some local offices may be held by Georgian Muslims, there are no Georgian Muslim 
politicians in the central government.  This is a noticeable trend in the cases as the fight for 
the Georgian Muslim community happens at the local, grassroots, level and there is no one 
in parliament advocating for their side.  Additionally, there have been some instances where 
Georgian Muslim politicians have been removed from office, particularly in Adigeni 
municipality (OC Media, 2018).  The legal legitimacy of their removal is unclear. 
Organizations such as the State Agency of Religious Affairs and the Administration of 
Muslims of All Georgia (AMAG) exist to handle minority issues, but are distrusted by the 
Georgian Muslim community and seen as too closely connected to the state. Implementation 
of terms of reference of these organizations is viewed as weak and problematic.  Without 
these organizations accurately representing the will of the Georgian Muslim community, they 
are left with no real representation in the government.   
The fight for the rights of the Georgian Muslim community occurs at the civil society 
level.  The Union of Georgian Muslims is a non-governmental organization that fights for the 
rights of the Georgian Muslim population, particularly in the issue of the Batumi mosque.  In 
addition to this, the only organizations fighting for their rights that understand the rights are 
NGO organizations such as the Georgian Young Lawyers Association (GYLA) or the Human 
Rights Education and Monitoring Center (EMC).  Finally, according to Eka Chitanava of the 
Tolerance and Diversity Institute, there has been a noticeable increase of civil society action 
among Georgian Muslims, an example of this is the increase of female Georgian Muslims 
wearing headscarves (Chitanava, 2019).  While action is increasingly happening at the civil 
society level, the lack of representation in the central government keeps the fight for the 
community’s rights outside of the central government.       
Turkophobia  
In all of the cases, the fears of Turkey are mentioned by at least one of the parties 
involved.  The fear of growing Turkish influence is quotes by members of the church, right-
wing politicians, and locals being interviewed.  The cited fears are that Turkey is somehow 
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manipulating the Georgian Muslim population to build religious buildings.  It has also been 
claimed that these religious buildings are used to convert the local Georgian Orthodox 
population to Islam, which is implied that they would then shift their loyalty to Turkey.  The 
question of the loyalty of the Georgian Muslim population is imperatively asked in these 
cases, and the Georgian Muslim population is forced to take measures in order to publicly 
assert their loyalty to Georgia through rejecting financial aid from Turkey and severing any 
other possibly assumed connections to Turkey.      
In Nigvziani, the protests began around the proposed house of worship because people 
were afraid that it would be used as a base for Turkish agents.  Protestors can be quoted 
saying that they did not want Turks to be coming to their village.  Rumors began to circulate 
that a Turkish businessman funds Georgian Muslims in Nigvziani.  The local Mufti addressed 
this saying:  
A Turkish citizen purchased a house and then sold it to a Georgian citizen because he 
could not use it. We opened a temple there. Anyone claiming that we did not have 
enough funds to buy the house is not correct. We collected the money and bought 
everything with our own money (humanrights.ge, 2012).   
This is one of several instances where Georgian Muslims had to prove that Turkey was not 
involved in supporting them.   
Turkophobia played an important role in the case of Chela as well.  The minaret was 
constructed by a company in Turkey and delivered to the Georgian-Turkish border.  
According to one of the interviews with an opponent of the minaret, it had to be inspected for 
broadcasting equipment installed by Turkey to communicate with the Georgian Muslim 
population (Democracy & Freedom Watch, 2016)29. 
The house in Kobuleti planned to be a madrassa was owned by a Turkish citizen.  
According to Christian protestors, Mr. Buyuk told local residents that it would become a hotel 
and spent a great deal of money on the building (Human Rights House, 2014).  Residents 
were surprised and angered to find that the house was being converted into a madrassa.  
Further interviews showed that this was believed to be part of a Turkish plot to convert the 
 
29 It is not verified that this was the reason for the Revenue Service dismantling the minaret. 
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local population to Islam as it was built in a largely Christian area.  Locals believe that this 
Islamic boarding school intends to recruit students from the local poor population through 
promises of free education in Turkey (Democracy & Freedom Watch, 2014).  Furthermore, 
the man renting the madrassa was originally gifted the building, but he instead opted to rent 
the building to stave off accusations of being a Turkish agent.  The tenant explains:    
The [property owner] wanted to assign the building to us for free but the Turkish 
owner of the company was not allowed to cross the border. We did not travel to 
Turkey either. So, we refused to receive the building as a gift not to encourage 
additional wrong interpretations of the fact. So, we signed rent agreement.  
(Humanrights.ge, 2015).   
Again, the local Muslims need to adamantly prove that they are not being funded by Turkey, 
even going so far as to deny offers of aid from Turkish citizens.           
The case of the Batumi mosque has been highly politicized, particularly during 
election times and was closely linked to the fear of Turkish influence.  A deal was struck with 
Turkey in 2009 wherein Turkey would restore Georgian historic sites on its territory if it 
allowed Turkey to restore historic Turkish sites on Georgian territory.  This restoration 
included a second mosque in Batumi, the Azizye mosque, which was met with much protest, 
led by the local clergy as it was seen as a symbol of Ottoman imperialism.  In 2012, after 
Georgian Dream took power, the deal was canceled. The mosque would not be reconstructed.  
Sophie Zviadadze explains,  
I think it’s also interesting that no only Christian Adjarans have this Turkophobic 
sentiment even Muslim Adjarans.  It’s very interesting because they accept that they 
are Muslims but they want not to have such a historical or cultural religious tie with 
turkey.  I think it’s why they want to be connected with Georgia and they are afraid 
that if we have such a positive connection or acceptance of Turkey, they are 
Georgianness will be under question (Zviadadze, 2019).  
In the Georgian Muslims’ fight for the mosque and in their daily lives, they must continuously 
reassert their loyalty to Georgia.  The proposed second mosque of Batumi is funded by money 
from the community and they have publicly refused aid from Turkey.  Furthermore, the 
mosque would not be given a Turkish name or even be constructed in a Turkish or Persian 
style, instead using elements of modern architecture.           
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The Georgian Orthodox Church 
Throughout the issues of religious conflict, the role of the Georgian Orthodox church 
cannot be ignored.  Much of the pushback against the activities of the Georgian Muslim 
community comes from the church either directly, or through influencing the local 
population.  In some cases, the church becomes involved in situations where they were not 
initially involved, acting as representatives of the Christian community.  Cases involving 
disputes between the Georgian Christian and Muslim population are labeled religious 
disputes and representatives of the patriarchy are called to meet with Georgian Muslim 
representatives to settle the disputes.  Furthermore, members of the patriarchy believe that 
Georgian Muslims are not fully Georgians, the term “return” to their ancestors’ religion is 
commonly used.  Because of this, the church actively focuses on proselytism in Adjara, in an 
attempt to “help return Georgians to their true religion” (Zviadadze, 2019).  Because of this 
view about Georgian Muslims, the church is active in hindering the activities of the Georgian 
Muslims once they enter the public space, such as building a mosque, for example.  In many 
of the cases, protests against the Georgian Muslims are led by members of the clergy.          
In the case of Batumi, the church is the main opponent of the mosque (Zviadadze, 
2019).  In 2012, when the construction was set to begin on the Sultan Azizye mosque, the 
church organized protests against this and the deal was cancelled (JAM news, 2017).  
Numerous times, the church stated that they were against a second mosque in Batumi, stating 
that there were a large number of mosques in Adjara, more than churches and that this was 
unfair to the Christian population (OC Media, 2018).  While the ongoing struggle for the 
second mosque was between the Georgian Muslim community and the government, it can be 
understood that this was for the sake of not angering the church.  Throughout this process, 
there were several protests against Georgian Muslims constructing their mosque because it 
was believed to be another attempt by Turkey.  All of these protests were led by priests 
(Zviadadze, 2019).  Eventually, when the tent mosque was constructed, priests continually 
approached the worshippers and told them that they were not allowed to pray there (JAM 
news, 2017).   
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In Chela, priests at the nearby Zarzma monastery is particularly aggressive against 
the activities of the Georgian Muslim community.  Local Muslims interviewed note that he 
attempted to destroy the house that was being used as a mosque in 2000 (Democracy & 
Freedom Watch, 2015).  The issue of the minaret occurred because of a petition created by 
the priests at Zarzma and when the minaret was being returned to the outskirts of the village, 
this was protested by Christians led by the local clergy.  When an agreement was reached 
with the minaret, members of the patriarchy were called to discuss the issue, wherein it was 
decided that the minaret would be put into the custody of the patriarchy, rather than with the 
government.  Finally, when the minaret was reinstalled in the middle of the night, this was 
met with protests by priests the following day.  
While the church was not involved in inciting the protests at Kobuleti, they made 
statements about the situation.  The statement made by Patriarch Ilia II states that while he 
condemns the nailing of the pig’s head to the madrassa door, the madrassa should not have 
been built in a Christian neighborhood in the first place.  Human Rights groups criticized this 
saying that the Georgian Orthodox Church has distanced itself from the attacks, but not from 
the cause of the assailants (eurasianet, 2014).   
In Mokhe, prior to the local Muslim community claiming the ruins, the church did 
not lay claim to the ruins.  After the local Muslim community claimed the ruins and tried to 
reconstruct a mosque, the church claimed that the building was a church before it was a 
mosque.  Given the church’s ability to easily claim property that was taken during the Soviet 
Union, had the ruins been deemed a church, the church could have taken it away from the 
local Muslims, thus preventing them from building a mosque in the village.  It was also noted 
by several interviewees that the priests from the nearby Zarzma monastery made threats to 
the local Muslim community about entering the ruins.   
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Analysis 
 Analysis of the patterns evident from the descriptions can be explained by the fact 
that Georgia is a new country.  After its declaration of independence of the Soviet Union, it 
declared itself to be on the path towards becoming a liberal democracy, joining the West30 
(King, 2008).  After declaring itself a democracy, Georgia essentially collapsed into civil war 
and the state had to be reconstructed from the ruins.  While Georgia is structured as a 
democracy, the process of becoming a democracy, or “Democratic Consolidation” takes time.  
This process includes going through stages such as state weakness, issues with crime and 
corruption, and a fragile sense of security in the ability of the state to provide public goods 
(Mucha, 2007).  In this context, the policies/attitudes of the central government and the 
Georgian Orthodox Church, as well as popular Turkophobia can be understood to be 
interrelated causes of the issues faced by the Georgian Muslim minority.  It is in this context 
that these factors will be analyzed as the causes.   
The Central Government 
Georgian Muslim/Christian conflicts grow out of an illiberal democracy in Georgia, 
that is, a majoritarian democracy, rather than a liberal democracy that fully supports the rights 
of minorities.  The government is often accused of doing little to protect the Georgian Muslim 
minority.  In fact, in several cases, the government was accused as being part of the problem. 
In almost all of the religious conflicts studied, the government, both local and central, sided 
with the dominant group.  Several of the people interviewed who were involved in these 
conflicts described the government as undemocratic and unhelpful.  Furthermore, some 
Georgian Muslims believe that the government is trying to use means to silence them rather 
than help them. As would be expected, trust in the government among the Georgian Muslim 
minority is low (Kalatozishvili, 2019).  
 
30 The south Caucasus republics were rushing headlong into an era of political change, with few people who 
could argue convincingly for re-appropriating the brand of democracy that had seemed promising, for a 
fleeting moment, at the end of the First World War. When Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia became fully 
independent in 1991, they adopted the same flags that the Bolsheviks had pulled down seventy years earlier 
(King, 2008) 
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The rationale for its majoritarian democracy is seen in its long and tumultuous history. 
Georgia is still a new country.  The modern nation of Georgia has only existed since the 
1990s, and the years since have been turbulent times. As a very diverse country, divided on 
ethnic, linguistic, and religious lines, maintaining the unity of the nation can be a challenge. 
The ruling body’s position of power is very fragile. To put it bluntly, the state is weak, 
although stronger than during the 1990s.  A weak state is unable to provide public goods due 
to some obstacles such as disputes with minority populations or government mistrust due to 
their being a lack of consolidated democratic culture.  Where the state is weak and unable to 
provide public goods such as the reinforcement of ideas of nationhood, another institution 
will fill this void like the Georgian Orthodox Church.    
Nationalism31 remains strong, but trust in the central government is low (Charles, 
2010). Protests against the government have been frequent, with the latest occurring during 
this writing when protestors demanded freer elections and the removal of the speaker of 
parliament. The frequency of protests and the fact that Georgia has experienced only one 
democratic transition of power in its history are indicative of a delicate national stability.  To 
stay in power, the government must ensure that it does nothing to anger the population and 
ensure minor protests do not become major revolutions.  It must maintain its legitimacy 
through adhering to the aspects that unite the country, or rather, most of the country: 
democracy, history, the national religion, and the national language.  To remain in power, the 
central government must ensure it satisfies the will of the majority population, even if doing 
so may violate some of its liberal democratic values.   
Georgian Muslims are not members of the political majority, even though they are 
ethnic Georgians and Georgian is their first language. They are excluded from the political 
majority because they do not follow the national religion, something seen as a signifier of 
“true Georgianness” (Zviadadze, 2019).  The Georgian Muslim minority is tolerated by the 
political majority for the most part, but conflict arises when a minority member enters into 
cultural negotiations through asserting their freedom of speech in the public space.  The 
public space refers to what can be seen by the general public, such as celebrating a Muslim 
 
31 This refers to nationalism of the country’s dominant group, the Georgian Orthodox Christians.   
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holiday in the main square, or building a mosque. The dominant majority would prefer the 
Georgian Muslims practice their religion in private space, where a minority is easier to 
tolerate. The private space, refers to what the general public does not see, such as a home, or 
a typical Georgian house being used as a mosque.  The government must respond to minority 
conflicts very carefully to please the political majority, as well as appear democratic both 
locally and abroad.  To maintain the appearance of a democracy, conflict resolution is 
delegated to local actors or to compliant quasigovernmental organizations.   
Democratic Legitimacy 
 The conflict that occurred at Nigvziani was the new ruling party’s chance to prove 
that it would be more open and less heavy-handed than the previous ruling party.  The 
government announced publicly that in the spirit of democracy it would not intervene but 
instead give local religious leaders the authority to solve the dispute peacefully (Georgia 
Today, 2012).  This approach was adopted and praised by Christians and even some Georgian 
Muslims, in all of the other cases as well.  In Chela, when tensions were diffused and an 
agreement was made between religious leaders, it was praised as a success of democracy 
(Agenda.ge, 2013)32.  Although this approach gave the new government legitimacy among 
its citizens, by allowing a peaceful discussion to occur at the local level rather than have a 
strict response from the central government, it treated the issue as “religious” rather than a 
minority issue (Humanrights.ge, 2016).  The government’s position was that the dispute was 
among Georgian Muslims and Christians and should be handled by religious leaders. This 
gave the green light for this type of public space negotiations. Critics maintain “It is the result 
of local governments and law enforcement not responding to the problem adequately. If the 
government had made some repressive steps to solve the problem in Nigvziani, the process 
would have stopped” (Georgia Today, 2013).  While the government’s logic is condemned 
 
32 On 28 November [2013], the Union of Georgian Muslims released a statement concerning the restoration 
of the minaret. They extend they’re thanks to everyone who ensured the return of minaret to its place. ‘We 
believe that this is the event when one may say that democracy is gaining the upper hand in Georgia. This is 
the achievement of every citizen of Georgia regardless of their belief and denomination. On behalf of 
Georgian Muslims, we would like to thank everyone who participated in a peaceful and democratic 
resolution of this problem,’ the statement reads (Tabula, 2013). 
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by Human Rights groups, it is approved by many citizens in both the majority and minority 
population as a democratic method for settling disputes (Agenda.ge, 2013).     
Organizations like the State Agency for Religious Affairs and AMAG were ostensive 
established to protect minority rights, but have been widely criticized for not accurately 
representing the communities that they are meant to protect.  As the study by Caucasian 
House revealed, they are heavily reliant on government funding, most of which goes to the 
organization leaders.  Critics maintain that while the framework for these organizations 
exists, implementation is corrupted by in reality being an instrument of the government, 
rendering them ineffective.  These organizations are unable to become autonomous as they 
would lose funding if they acted against the will of their patron, the central government 
(Caucasian House, 2016). By acting through these organizations, the government does not 
acknowledge that there is an ongoing and systematic issue with the Georgian Muslim 
minority.  The government does not investigate claims of police violence, does not charge 
perpetrators with hate crimes, and blames each rise in tensions on “outside forces.”   
Revealing police violence against a minority risks losing international legitimacy. 
Public prosecution of hate crimes risks the appearance of being heavy-handed like the 
previous regime, because it would delegitimize their hands-off approach to resolving the 
issues.  Finally, if the government admits to an issue between the Georgian Muslim minority 
and Christian majority that is going unpunished, human rights groups would question why 
the government is not doing more.    
Minority representation  
The protections present in the Constitution are poorly implemented.  Hate crimes are 
rarely prosecuted. Minorities are not given an equal platform in cultural negotiations, and 
face additional barriers with which the dominant group does not have to contend.  The 
question then arises, “why doesn’t the government simply give this group these protections?”  
The answer is that absent are politicians who will fight for the rights of this minority.  This 
is due to a number of factors in Georgia’s society and history.   
First, all of these cases happened in areas where Georgian Muslims are not the 
majority, Nigvziani, Mokhe, Chela, and Adigeni are regions where Georgian Muslims were 
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moved from Adjara for ecological reasons while Kobuleti and Batumi are large cities on the 
coast where Georgian Muslims are a minority.  The types of issues discussed are seldom or 
easily dealt with in the villages of highland Adjara, where the Georgian Muslims are the 
dominant group.   
Second, the reason that minorities in general are poorly represented in the state goes 
back to the Rose Revolution.  Saakashvili ran his campaign promising to be both democratic 
and to put an end to corruption.  The corruption in Georgia was in large part due to 
decentralization.  Saakashvili sought to strengthen the state through centralization and 
nationalism.  This turned out to be counter to the process of giving minorities more rights and 
autonomy, as Saakashvili needed loyalty and less of a devolution of power.  This ended up 
in leaders in minority regions being less autonomous from the central government and ruling 
party.  As a result, the leaders in these regions are chosen by the government (George, 2008) 
who would naturally choose leaders loyal to them.        
Third, when Saakashvili set his sights on Adjara, he promised the Georgian Muslim 
population that their rights would be better protected and that they would have more 
representation.  Because of this, the Georgian Muslims supported Saakashvili’s party, The 
United National Movement (UNM).  In 2012, when Georgian Dream came in to power, UNM 
had a horrible reputation and UNM party members fell out of positions of power.  While it 
has died down, there is a common understanding that Georgian Muslims remain loyal to 
UNM, hurting their chances at getting elected and members of the Georgian Dream party not 
seeing them as their electoral base.  Finally, as Pelkmans explains “since [Georgian] Muslims 
form the lower echelons of society, they have very little tactical power to alter these—as they 
see it—attacks on their community. Instead, most people retreat into forms of silent 
resistance” (Pelkmans M. , 2002).  As Nodia and Scholtbach add:  
The combination of the overwhelming poverty of the ethnic minority enclaves, the 
memory of separatism in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and the existence of political 
obstacles such as the political party law and threshold law, has created a sense of 
unease among the ethnic minority communities, causing them to opt out of Georgian 
political life altogether (Nodia & Scholtbach, 2006).  
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Given the historical and political climate of minorities in Georgia, it would be rather difficult 
for a member of a minority group to be elected to a political position.  It would also be 
difficult for a non-Muslim Georgian to get elected to political power if they advocated for 
stronger implementation of the Georgian Muslim minority’s right to build a mosque, for 
example.   
Lastly, Georgians in general do not trust or believe that elections will bring about 
change (Elbakidze, 2019).  Because of this, the fight for the rights of the Georgian Muslim 
minority exists at the grassroots level in the form of civil society and the aid of Human Rights 
Groups.  Groups such as the Tolerance and Diversity Institute and the Human Rights 
Education and Monitoring Center give legal aid to Georgian Muslim communities and 
criticize the government while groups such as the Union of Georgian Muslims actively fight 
for the rights of the Georgian Muslim community (EMC, 2016).  While these groups show 
progress towards representation of the Georgian Muslim minority, they only exist at the civil 
society level and not at the parliamentary level.  Without achieving true representation within 
the government, Georgia faces little popular pressure to change its minority policies.  
Simultaneously, the government must please the equally powerful institution, the Georgian 
Orthodox Church, which is the source of the government’s legitimacy and votes.   
The Georgian Orthodox Church 
The Georgian Orthodox Church is a fully independent religious institution.  While 
Georgia is a secular nation, the church is widely understood to be the national religion of 
Georgia.  The vast majority of Georgians follow this religion. It is the most trusted institution 
in the nation (Charles, 2010).  Christianity is deeply rooted into the history of Georgia.  
Georgia adopted Christianity in the 4th century AD and is noted as the second existing nation 
to have adopted it33.  The territory of Georgia is covered with thousands of Christian historical 
sites, ruins, churches, and monasteries.  Throughout its history of invasions by Islamic 
empires, Christianity is seen as the aspect of their nation that has helped it survive to this day.  
An important aspect of what makes a Georgian a Georgian is by speaking Georgian, being 
ethnically Georgian, and to be a follower of the Georgian Orthodox Church.  The current 
 
33 Armenia is credited with being “the first nation to adopt Christianity” 
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patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox church, Ilia II, is extremely popular.  He has been in 
power for many years, and was seen as a symbol of stability during turbulent times (Charles, 
2010).  Because of this historical and cultural significance as well as its high amount of trust, 
the Georgian Orthodox Church holds immense power in Georgia.  This power comes in the 
form of influence over a vast majority of the population, over elections, and through 
legitimacy of politicians.  As the TDI has investigated, the church is given privileges in 
Georgian society that is not shared by any other religious group.  According to Article 9 of 
the Georgian constitution, “People are free to practice any religion of their choosing in 
Georgia, but the state recognizes the importance of the role of the Georgian Orthodox 
Church” (Parliament of the Republic of Georgia, 1995).  This can be seen in the church’s 
ability to acquire state property and for clergy to be exempt from military service, to name a 
few examples.     
Research also confirms the second hypothesis, which refers to the power of the 
Georgian Orthodox Church and its potential role in initiating or resolving conflicts between 
Georgian Muslims and Christians.  Both groups are ethnically Georgian, speak Georgian, and 
have a territorial connection to what is considered to be Georgian territory. The only 
difference between them is their religion.  Unlike trust in the Georgian Central Government, 
trust in the church and religiosity is very high (Charles, 2010).  The church has immense 
influence, it is able to sway massive amounts of voters, and ultimately making it able to use 
its influence to remove governments from power.  As long as the government is able to avoid 
offending the church, then the church is able to maintain support for the government.  While 
the church is not outwardly against Islam, Islam and any other religion in the country is a 
threat to their power.   
The church has publicly stated its opposition to Islam and any sort of advancement of 
Islam in Georgia.  The common belief, especially among the church, is that Adjarans are 
“lost” and that they must “return to their ancestors’ religion” (Zviadadze, 2019).  Some 
members of the clergy have even stated there are no such things as “Georgian Muslims” 
(Democracy & Freedom Watch, 2016).  They believe that Georgian Muslims should convert 
to Christianity in order to become “true Georgians.”  The church conducts much proselytizing 
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in Adjara and is adamantly against anything seen as “the spread of Islam” in this region or 
anywhere else in Georgia. The Orthodox Church has been particularly aggressive in ensuring 
that Islam should not be brought into the public space in regions where Georgian Muslims 
reside.   
The power of the Orthodox Church in Georgia is not to be underestimated.  Many 
Georgians see their faith as something that has kept their nation together throughout countless 
invasions from Muslim empires.  The institution of the church holds the role in the Georgian 
psyche as the protector of the nation (Charles, 2010).  There is no denying that Georgia owes 
much of its modern existence to its autocephalous church, which maintained Georgian 
nationhood throughout centuries of conquest against Islamic empires. As the most trusted 
institution in the country (Charles, 2010), the church has the power to give legitimacy to the 
government and politicians (Elbakidze, 2019).  
The Georgian Orthodox church is unique to the Georgian nation in that it represents 
the nation in a similar way that the state does.  Because of this, the government must have 
the legitimacy of the church in order to stay in power (Lorusso, 2013).  While the government 
must appear to uphold the ideals of liberal democracy, the government must also show that 
it follows and will protect the Georgian Orthodox Church.  The government does this by not 
going against the church and even by keeping up with the appearance that it is defending it 
(Lorusso, 2013).  What has changed in the last decade essentially is not a change within the 
church’s goals, but a change in opportunities to pursue those goals.  With the Georgian Dream 
government in charge, the church is able to act against Georgian Muslims as they have not 
been able to under previous governments.   
Turkophobia 
The third hypothesis is also confirmed in that grounds for mistrust of the Georgian 
Muslim minority are found in the historic fear of the influence of Turkey, or Turkophobia. In 
all of the investigated conflicts, locals protesting against the Georgian Muslim community 
cited fears of Turkey and their perceived “ideological war of expansion into Adjara.” 
(Democracy & Freedom Watch, 2014).  Most Georgians, already weary of the superpower 
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to their north (Russia)34, see Turkey as another threat from a powerful country to exert its 
influence on the politics of the country.  This gives way to xenophobia, or specifically the 
fear of Turkish expansion. As Turkey is an Islamic power and gives aid to the Georgian 
Muslim population, the loyalty of the Georgian Muslims is brought into question as their 
activities are seen as an increase in Turkish influence.   
This fear of Turkish influence is not ungrounded.  Adjara was a part of the Ottoman 
Empire for centuries before becoming a part of Georgia under the Russian Empire in 1878.  
With Georgian nationalism being a new idea in the 19th century, Adjarans did not see 
themselves as Georgians, but rather as Adjarans, and many of them emigrated to the Ottoman 
Empire (Pelkmans M. , 2006).  As part of the treaty of Kars, the Ottoman Empire, and later 
Turkey would ensure the protection of the Georgian Muslim population of Adjara, leading to 
Adjara becoming an autonomous republic during the formation of the Soviet Union (King, 
2008).  After Georgia gained independence from the Soviet Union and its anti-religious 
policies, religiosity grew rapidly.  Just as churches were being built and reclaimed, so too 
were mosques.  As the border with Turkey opened in the 1990s, Turkish citizens, many of 
them descendants of the Adjarans who fled during Adjara’s annexation in the 19th century 
and relatives of Adjarans who found themselves on the Turkish side of the border during the 
establishment of the Soviet Union in the 1920s, gave an enormous amount of financial aid to 
build mosques, receive religious texts, and to obtain religious education in Turkey (Pelkmans 
M. , 2006).  This Turkish influence was met with much dissatisfaction among Adjaran 
Christians, calling upon historical reasons for the mistrust of Turkey.   
After the Rose Revolution in 2004, the Georgian central government was able to 
regain control of Adjara from the independent and autocratic Aslan Abashidze.  Once 
Abashidze was deposed, President Saakashvili opened Adjara to foreign investors, which 
mostly included Turks, and there was a wave of immigration and economic change in Batumi.  
This caused much backlash from the community in reaction to the rapid change of the 
economic and cultural landscape.  Saakashvili’s “friendliness” with Turkey was very 
 
34 This refers to the 2008 war between Georgia and Russia and the poor relations between Georgia and 
Russia in the wake of Russia’s recognition of Georgia’s separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.   
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unpopular throughout the country and highly criticized by the opposition.  Because of this, 
Georgian Muslims must constantly reassert their loyalty to Georgia and their opposition to 
Turkey.  Since then, the influence of Turkey and immigration from Turkey has remained 
central political issues in Adjara.  Far right groups and populist politicians have made protests 
and Turkophobic remarks.  One politician was noted for saying that “the smell of Doner 
kebab has ruined Abashidze Street” (Pelkmans M. , 2002) and a far-right group led a march 
down a street with many Turkish businesses (OC Media, 2018).    
Turkey continues to be a perceived threat in Georgia as the nation’s historic enemy. 
Turkey has had economic and cultural influence in Adjara since its independence.  
Admittedly, Turkey has played a part in the economic boom of Batumi and supports the 
religious education and activities of the Georgian Muslims. However, the extent and motives 
appear to be widely exaggerated as an effect of growing inequality in Adjara (Zviadadze, 
2019).  Turkey is the perceived enemy and perpetrator of this inequality.  Islam and Turkey 
are synonymous and perceived by the local population that the Georgian Muslims are 
influenced by and are more loyal to Turkey (Zviadadze, 2019).   
The reality of the situation, as explained by Dr. Zviadadze (2019), is that Turkey does 
have a small amount of influence in Adjara. Turkish citizens own many businesses, although 
the majority are owned by Russians, and Turkey supports the local Muslim population.  In 
the 90s, many mosque initiatives taken by Georgian Muslims were sponsored by Turks, but 
these were mostly Georgian Turks who emigrated after the annexation of Adjara in the 19th 
century (Pelkmans M. , 2002).  Further, most of the growing intelligentsia among the 
Georgian Muslim community are Georgian Muslims who receive free education in Turkey 
(Zviadadze, 2019).   
Turkey’s political intentions appear to have been greatly magnified through fear and 
suspicion (Zviadadze, 2019).  No overt evidence has been uncovered of malevolent intentions 
as ascribed to Turkey by its opponents.  No collusions between Turkish and Georgian 
Muslims have been proven, other than financial aid.  Popular Turkophobia is a convenient 
tool for use by right wing politicians and the Church clergy to rally local Christians to protest 
against Georgian Muslim activities.  Despite facts to the contrary, given the history of 
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geopolitics in the region, the power of Turkophobia as a political tool unlikely to diminish 
any time soon. 
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Conclusion  
 What this research has shown is that the attitudes/policies of the Central Government 
and the Georgian Orthodox Church, as well as popular Turkophobia are all factors that bear 
on the incidents of conflict and tensions between the Georgian Orthodox and Muslim 
populations.   However, the ultimate issue is that Georgia has not yet developed a culture of 
liberal ideals necessary to accept pluralism in the cultural negotiations of its society; that is, 
it is not ready to accept that a “true Georgian” can be anything other than Orthodox Christian.  
While the Georgian Muslim minority is tolerated, when they try and bring their religious 
expression into the public space, i.e. building a mosque, the majority population becomes 
upset.  This anger and aversion to cultural pluralism is further reinforced by popular 
Turkophobia spread by right–wing politicians, nationalist groups, and the Georgian Orthodox 
Church.  These incidents often escalate due to a lack of well-implemented minority protection 
mechanisms in the government.  Strong legal protections do not exist, not only due to the 
lack of people in the government fighting for it, but because of objections by the church as a 
challenge of its power.  While legal mechanisms do exist, they are weak and not well 
implemented.  But giving religious minorities more rights and protections could challenge 
church authority and influence. A national church at odds with the central government could 
use its influence with the majority population to eventually achieve its objectives by 
decreasing voter support for the government, which could end in the government’s loss of 
power.   
Further, these poorly implemented minority protections give the illusion of 
democracy.  In reality, while the government must maintain the image of protecting minority 
rights for the sake of democratic legitimacy, it must be careful not to do so in a way that 
angers the majority.  A government that angers the majority population, could easily be 
removed from power. The government acts in a way that produces an image of protecting the 
minority, but in reality, ensures that the majority population is appeased.  It achieves this 
through raising technical objections for not allowing a mosque to be built, or by creating a 
non-representative commission to determine whether the ruins of a mosque are truly those of 
a mosque, or fails to punish police officers accused of violence against Georgian Muslim 
protesters.    
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The state is weak. It has a fragile hold on power and is fully reliant on the favor of the 
majority population, and therefore the church, to stay in power.  Being a religious institution 
in charge of the spiritual protection of the Georgian population, the church is understandably 
against any attempt by minority religions to challenge their power.  They will do everything 
in their power to ensure that these minority religions are weakened or even eradicated so that 
they may remain in power.  One tool that they use against the Georgian Muslim minority in 
particular is spreading the fear of the influence of Turkey, a challenger for influence in the 
borderland regions, particularly Adjara.  In a perfect world, a powerful religious organization 
and xenophobia could be contained by a liberal democratic government, but this is not 
something that Georgia’s government is in a position to do.  Georgia’s government, while 
much stronger and more developed than 20 years ago, is still unable to fairly resolve these 
issues while maintaining its power and authority.   
To answer the research question of whether the government is majoritarian, the 
answer must be yes.  It is majoritarian because it needs to be.  Georgia is certainly a 
democracy, but an illiberal one.  While democratization is not a finite and clear line, Georgia 
is judged to be on the path to becoming a developed and liberal democracy, which was agreed 
upon by all interviewees.  However, until Georgia’s society can develop a culture of 
democratic liberalism to allow for cultural pluralism, conflicts like the ones described in this 
research will continue to occur in the future.   
What the research has shown is that among the three interrelated causes of the issues 
faced by the Georgian Muslim population, the role of the Georgian government is what can 
be changed.  What needs to happen is for the state to grow in strength in a liberal democratic 
way.  Ultimately, the state needs to be independent from the Georgian Orthodox Church in 
order to freely pass legislation protecting religious minorities.  Second, the culture of 
democracy, specifically liberal democracy needs to form among Georgian society.  This can 
happen through education expansion and reform.  In order for this culture of liberal ideals to 
consolidate, people need to be educated in order to understand the importance cultural 
pluralism in a society and that majoritarianism can lead to violations of Human Rights in a 
multicultural society.  While these changes cannot happen overnight, all of those interviewed 
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for this research agreed that these were what needs to happen in Georgia in order to fix this 
and several other problems in Georgian society.     
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 Appendices 
Appendix A 
Interview 1 
Interviewee: Eka Chitanava 
Interviewer: Logan Hulsey 
Logan: Could you start by telling me about your experience working with the Adjaran 
Muslim community? In or out of Adjara... 
Eka: so, I want to just precise...you're basically interested into Adjaran Muslims, and not 
Muslims in general right? 
Logan: just Georgians, right 
Eka: So, first of I'll tell everyone about TDI, because mainly I'm working now on the topic 
of Adjaran Muslims through TDI and today I was founded in 2013, so since then we are 
working on the rights of religious minorities, etc. Freedom of religion bill issue.  But before 
that I was collaborating with the Tolerance and hospice of the public defender, so my first 
experience with the Adjaran community was when I was on my assignment to make a little 
documentary video about Adjaran Muslims in ... and the rituals they observe.  So that’s 
how my interest started and also I was quite interested because how I was looking at the 
national identity of Georgians is that it is assumed by the majority that in order to be 
Georgian to have this national identity in Georgian you have to be orthodox and int that 
sense Georgian Muslims Adjaran Muslims, generally Muslims compose 10 percent of the 
population and the majority of them are Adjaran Muslims, especially in the mountainous 
regions, highland Adjara.  they are like 80-90 percent of the population and they’re Muslim.  
also its interesting to observe over the recent years how this religiosity and their religious 
identity became very important for them in the public spaces especially and to be revealed 
in wearing garments like a religious garment, headscarves for girls and men are demanding 
building a mosque in Adjara, the second mosque which is a hot issue even now and even 
our lawyers are involved.  we submitted a lawsuit in Batumi city court about. after their 
statement after their appeal for building a house of worship, so the mosque was denied by 
the mayor’s office.  if we look at the dynamics, after the collapse of the soviet union they, 
their religiosity was not manifested in the public space and then it was after the survival of 
this religiosity like in other countries of the soviet union Muslims also started fighting for 
their rights for the equality, for the manifestation of their religiosity in the public space but 
that was kind of...03:57  in that period the patriarchy also started a massive wave of 
indoctrination and proselytism in highland Adjara, they started building special universities 
and schools where Muslims could study free of charge, especially in highland Adjara and 
so they tried to impose the idea that they’re kind of betrayers of their ancestors who were 
Christians and after the rule of the ottomans they were converted to Islam and now it’s time 
to convert to Christianity so it was kind of imposed this grand narrative on them and I don’t 
remember but I remember in the beginning of the 90s with president G made a statement 
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that you Adjarans are also Georgians, you are ALSO Georgians means that you're kind of 
no you’re not fully fledged Georgians and it continues until now.  so this city of Batumi 
itself is quite multicultural its quite mixed there are Christians and Muslims but the 
highland Adjara is more populated by Muslims and they still reserve their traditions and 
religiosity and they did not reveal so much the interest to convert but also this conversion to 
Christianity became a kind of sign of modernity...if you want to be modern, live in an urban 
area and kind of be as others for the younger generation of Muslims it became kind of a 
necessity to convert to Christianity, especially those who travel to   
the capital from the periphery to study and somehow to forge their new identity.  05:59 but 
we see that for the recent 3-4 years young Muslims girls especially started wearing hijab 
and it also was criticized not only sometimes by the Christians but by Muslims for those 
whom this Islam was kind of folklorized during the soviet times...they were Muslims but 
they were not going to mosque they weren’t practicing religion so it was kind of a mixture 
of tradition and culture and something but not so vivid religious practice as for the new 
generation of Muslims it became very important to go to the mosque to have religious 
practice for girls to study the Quran because they can’t get religious education in Georgia.  
none of universities have theology, Muslim theology, that’s why they go very often to 
turkey.  so this is another problem, in 2012 there was a new wave of turkophobia and 
islamophobia and when prior to the elections, the new party GD won the elections some of 
the public speakers and writers and GD members they were trying to use the issue of the 
mosque to stir up this islamophobia in Adjara and they were saying that, oh we don’t want 
this smell of ciorba and kebab and so on and we want to bring back the old Adjara and not 
this full of Turks and those people and afterwards it became quite equated islamophobia 
and turkophobia and when you talk to students we had actually maybe you already saw they 
research about the narratives about the students, informal narratives how they see the issues 
so this religious diversity and ethnic diversity especially in Adjara they were saying that 
kinda this turkey represents a threat 08:17 to our cultural identity and represents a threat.  
maybe they don’t want to occupy Adjara but this ??? 08:30 issue.  but the issue that they 
might intrude to Georgia and might maybe not turn physically, but economically because 
Turks are coming and they have jobs and they kinda steal jobs from Georgians, ethnic 
Georgians so this narrative kinda creates the impression that Turkey is a threat but in this 
sense Georgian Muslims are a threat, represent a kind of threat.  so everything that’s 
accumulated in they cause this negative sentiments toward Adjaran Muslims but everyone 
says that if you go there, there are to problems in interpersonal relationships but there are 
problems are at the policy level 09:14 and it’s a problem with how the state reacts to all of 
this and also up till 2012 we’ve seen that there were it was not particularly in Adjara but it 
was against the Muslims, there were cases of gross violations of Muslims right when they 
wanted to build a house of worship or they wanted to have religious ritual and then the 
minaret of the mosque was cut in chela, then in Adigeni municipality and then in Mokhe we 
have seen that they wanted to protect their building, well former mosque but they were 
physically and verbally abused and these cases are not investigated where state 
representatives and police officers were allegedly involved in this physical violence so this 
everything showed how the state reacted to it and that the state was also part of, and 
reproducing this narrative of islamophobia or did nothing to prevent this...so for religious 
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minorities in ge and sexual minorities, always the problem arises when ???10:36 when there 
is an issue of manifestation of this identity in the public space but yea interpersonal 
relations like everything is ok and when I was doing my master’s degree first at CEU, I then 
went to do field work in Kobuleti I remember that when I entered the room of my host 
family and there was on the wall and on the one side there was a mosque and on the other 
side there was a Christian icon so they were next to each other and when I asked the family, 
so there were several generations of people one was a grandmother and grandfather and 
they were Muslims and then the next generation , husband and wife, they were, well one 
was Christian and the other Muslims and among children gen. they were, kinda one said 
one was fasting had the Christian fast and the other the Muslim fast.  so it was like a total 
mixture and it was everything peaceful and nobody was quarreling about anything or 
judging each other so it really, it happens but it’s important when the state is kinda 
instigating or not the policy is not oriented at the protection 11:57 uh or the state is not 
protecting the rights of minorities or somehow itself is reproducing this xenophobic 
narratives, then it happens when the situation is worse.  If you have any questions, I know I 
started in ??? 12:24  
Logan: no, yea you actually covered quite a bit there...yea I basically just wanted to go into 
a little bit of detail about what you covered....[explains research]...12:46 essentially what 
I’m looking for is patterns between these two kinda show the way that the state reacted 
toward these so if...I was interested in what you said about the importance of religiosity...a 
lot of what...what I've found is that a big shift happened between the regime of UNM to 
GD...what...I think a lot of ppl would say that this began with the incident in Nigvziani in 
Guria, and this was...when this went unpunished it kinda opened the floodgates basically, 
could you explain a bit what the difference are between UNM and GD in this particular 
issue. 
Eka: yea, during the UNM especially during the first half of Saakashvili’s tenure very 
strict...there was a very strict zero tolerance policy towards hate crimes, also included those 
committed on grounds of religious intolerance, so this meant that, it was revealed in how 
the state reacted towards Jehovah’s witnesses, crimes against JW and we've also seen in the 
last years, until 2012 the number of the cases of hate crimes or offenses committed on the 
grounds of religious intolerance they dropped significantly.  So it was a sign that then the 
state had very strict policy towards hate crime, so then the possible perpetrators, they 
somehow refrained from physical abuse, and when we’ve seen that during the pre-election 
campaign all this xenophobia, all this islamophobia, and up towards Nigvziani Tsintskharo, 
and it was the whole chain right.  so it first started when in Nigvziani, they did not have a 
proper adequate reaction and response to the hate crimes and then it caused as you said, the 
whole chain of other events and...but what was the difference in chela and in Mokhe was 
that over the government was not only passive, just not doing anything to protect and to 
ensure freedom of religion and belief, but we also see that police officers they were 
themselves involved in this violence, so they were not only passive, but it was itself 
aggressive towards its citizens, so that s how the situation aggravated but now for instance 
after the establishment of the human rights department, this interior ministry, we can say 
that, well the situation improved quite a lot it can be said concerning all kinds of crimes, 
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excluding maybe LGBT, because the situation is even harsher there, but concerning hate 
crimes committed on religious intolerance, or racial discrimination, so the investigation is 
usually started immediately and then they are qualified with the adequate articles of the 
criminal code (??)16:45 so the investigation is preceded and the situation in terms of this is 
better, but the situation has not improved in another sense, like what is it about local 
consuls and municipality councils who are entitled to issue the permit for construction for 
houses of worship and usually it happens that when some religious group wants to build a 
mosque for instance, like in Muslims case in Adjara, or JW in other cases or Catholics, and 
so on, we have a lot of examples what happens, just the majority of the orthodox population 
there are against it, and then the municipality decides that they don’t want to offend the 
majority and they come up with all kinds of artificial barriers to not issue this permit, but in 
Adjara’s case it’s even more kinda difficult and complicated issue because it’s not only that 
it is not decision (??) 17:51 at the local level, not only Batumi mayor's level but it’s also 
kinda state..uh like decision at higher level, because it for years and years, Muslims are 
demanding to build a mosque in Adjara and the first they wanted to somehow to, ask the 
government to help them, but then they decided that it’s all in vain after years and years 
they bought the land and ok they said we have our land we don’t want your money, we 
don’t' need your anything, we just need legal permit, and then when they applied to the 
mayor’s office they were denied and one of the arguments of denial was that: you know that 
this area is a kinda residential area, where the mosque cannot be built and you can build 
somewhere in the very high periphery, but not in this area where the land was already 
bought, but when we looked at kinda what their churches around, so there are churches all 
around in the residential area, so we see here this discriminatory attitude in the policy of the 
state, so it’s very obvious in this case.   
Logan: mmhm, ok 19:08 ...I guess I was wondering, what kind of...so you said that at the 
local level there’s a lot of push back because they don’t want to go against the majority, 
so...why doesn’t the state intervene in this case, or is it that that they want to but they can’t? 
like why? 
Eka: well first it’s the struggle with the state with needing the legitimacy from the GOC so 
in the case of Batumi its especially problematic, in other cases especially because there is 
also on the other hand the Georgian orthodox church and the parish and the congregation 
and it still has a high authority in the public like allegiance from the population, even 
though Georgians are not as Americans not really practicing religion if we look at number 
like going every week or having attending ceremonies, but for the identity for this national 
identity this is very important and they kinda identify themselves with the GOC.  and so it 
means that they have to come with conflict with the GOC, because building a mosque...first 
it was called Azizye mosque of the former ottoman sultan and they changed and said ok we 
don’t want this, we don’t want Turkish money, we have our money, it’s the will of the 
population, but also there’s another institution itself AMAG we call them, it was also 
created somehow by the state, but it was created this religious institution to distance itself 
from the Azeri controlled Muslim organization so kind of to establish kind of Georgian 
Muslim authority and they institution that would represent the Muslim Georgian’s Sunni 
Georgians and so it appeared that it became kind of puppet instrument in the hands of the 
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state to kind of control the situation like when there is a discussion about the rights of 
Muslims and violations and they never, they're all silence, they never criticize the gov't they 
never criticize the state, so the govt. somehow needs them.  and even this organization they 
were against other citizens their citizens and their Muslim community.  the Muslim 
community itself has like a self-organized group who applied for this permit, they want, we 
NEED another mosque because now we are praying outside under this open sky in the rain 
in winter and so on and they say ok maybe you don’t need this, maybe you need a madrassa 
and so they were transferred this property now they have this property and we don’t see any 
school, madrassa or anything open there.  so they have salaries and they are like silence so 
they never criticize the state, so in this situation this Muslims community is in a very 
difficult situation so the state does not want to offend the GOC because in there are also 
other groups like the ultra-conservative and ultranationalist groups, patriots alliance who 
started all this campaign, so they're kind of afraid of openly protecting the rights of 
Muslims because they will start the campaign and then the other groups, these far rights 
groups who are also instrumentalizing this issue of turkey and building a mosque so they 
kind of want to somehow 23:33 solve this issue whiteout following the issue and 
offering...now they’re offering to the community to involve AMAG also in the case so this 
community bought the land so they want to own it right, they want to have the rights on the 
mosque when they build it so they mayor’s office what it’s doing is they want to have some 
negotiations and they want to involve the, also they involve some non-muslims like polit 
institution AMAG in this case kind of to share the space and to share the mosque and of 
course it won’t do any good because they never represent the rights of the community in the 
right way.  they’re controlled totally by the state.  so, have I answered your question?    
Logan: 24:30 yes, you actually answered like 3 questions...so I’ve noticed this issue 
25:01...one thing that kept popping up in my research was that this issue is something that’s 
politicized or it’s in the political sphere and it needs to be not in the political sphere, do you 
thing that you can elaborate? how is it politicized? is it... 
Eka: yea its political as long as it’s as long as the state, s like actually a lot of things are 
related to politics in Georgia and if you mean politicized like...um...so it’s kind of...25:53 
it’s kind of an obvious thing when they religious community wants a place to for 
construction permit the municipality gives this permission so it shouldn’t go so far but this 
issue about the mosque which should be like average issue of building a house of worship, 
it became very political the state is involved and its decided at a very high level, but the 
argument of the other...like some experts or some govt representative is like that there is no 
problem it was all politicized and the issue was used by the opposition party actually, so 
GD members say that it was used by UNM, this Mokhe, chela, cases were started by them 
to start this conflict and to show that the Muslims rights are violated in reality, we don’t 
have any problems and we are all tolerant and Muslims were never persecuted and so on 
and so on.  as long as the state it’s the responsibility of the state to protect the rights and to 
ensure that the citizens have the rights to manifest their religion without any problems in 
the public space so as long as the state responsibility and it’s not protecting the rights of the 
citizens this issue is political, so I don’t think that its artificially politicized by any group, it 
just concerns the issue of the policy of the state, how it cares about for about a religious 
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minority, about the rights of religious minorities and it’s also political because we have here 
the problem of the separation of church and state and this protection of the secularity 
principle like this separation between these two institutions and so far the state, like neither 
governments like neither UNM or GD have managed or especially previous govts to 
completely distance themselves from the church because they still need their legitimacy so 
as long this issue is not solve as long as they don’t care about what the church says and like 
candles and go with what the patriarch says and initiate some legal issues according to the 
what the patriarch says right so like...it will be political as long as the issue is like this it 
will be political.   
Logan: ok...29:11 so I guess I’ll kind of go a little more into your opinion so how do you 
think this issue might be solved, like what do you think, what are the steps that could be 
taken in a perfect world to fix these issues?  
Eka: you mean like everything concerning Georgian Muslims of the thing I was talking 
about?  
Logan: yea 
Eka: so first when we are talking about hate crimes it’s a fully necessary that the state is 
responding to them timely and effectively and the public sees then that when you commit 
such a crime there is punishment for this, so it’s a kind of short term but very powerful 
instrument, so responding to hate crimes and another one is that you can’t like ensure that 
everything is improving long term only with this instrument so education is very important 
so we are also working on the formal education system in Georgia, what are the teachers 
attitudes, how they talk with Muslims in Adjaran schools they have a kind of impose the 
idea and aculeate(?)30:41  the idea that if you are Muslim you are, you know you converted 
to Islam and it was not your will it’s what your ancestors did because this was all 
conquerors and so on (???)30:50 so they want to somehow talk about their this identity and 
the sense of the old traumas and for them they have not experiences this this is not their 
collective memory, what they know is what their parents were Muslims they are Muslims 
and they like something in the practice but they don’t have to feel ashamed, and actually 
there is a good anthropologist, Tamta Khalvashi, she talks about their shame, how they are 
ashamed of their identity and the public makes them to be ashamed and so this deals with 
the environment, this is a matter of public education system, what are teachers education, 
what text books do they have to study and in the textbooks of Georgian literature and 
history how Muslims are represented all the time, Islam is always related with the 
conquerors and when you have this memory and you have this narrative that Islam is only 
associated with conquerors and with the ottoman empire and the Persian empire and so on 
and so this means that you can see really other things like culture, common culture and you 
can see like that this is a part of this multiculturalism and is a part of this kind of 
multicultural culture that we have today in Georgia and it’s also about tradition so another 
thing is like the big milestone is education, public education, and reforms and fundamental 
reforms in the public education system and like also how the state policy, not only in terms 
of hate crimes but all other issues, well public education is also part of state policy but the 
statements of the officials and the statements of the high officials like the parliamentarians 
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and public figures how they embrace this, to show that they embrace this multiculturalism 
and that they embrace these differences in identities and Muslims are kind not involved, 
politically involved in their local government issues so there was a research done by 
Muslim women and they, what they found out is that political engagement and civic 
engagement is perceived only as voting for somebody and going to elections otherwise they 
are passive, but in the case of building a mosque, one of the oldest issues surrounding this 
self-organized 33:47 group.  women also became very active, Tariel Nakaidze for instance 
the head of the Georgian Muslims union so he created like young youth group also the wing 
of this organization and Muslims are very active.  Muslims girls are very active, young girls 
who are very active who on the one hand are wearing these religious attire and on the other 
they are talking about equality and so-so for them the hijab is not a tool of intimidation or 
submission as it is represented in popular culture, but for them it’s kind of a tool of protest 
of their civic protest, because they're going against the majority in this sense, so for them a 
hijab has a different meaning, different cultural meaning, kind of a cultural or political 
meaning also.  so the statements and the attitudes of the public officials who appear in the 
media who appear in the media and in social networks and so on in the public space, so this 
is very important to have influence over the public sentiment and then of course how the 
state will distance itself from the dominant religious institution GOC and how, what kind of 
policy it will have towards minorities, so everything is interrelated to each other. 
Logan: 35:17 yea ok great, and then a follow up on that, so again, that’s what should 
happen, so...as it is now, Whats your opinion, do you think it’ll get better or do you think 
it’ll only get worse? like are things getting better?  
Eka: well the things is getting better up till the changes in the interior ministry for sure 
(??)35:42  with hate crimes (?) but I hope that it will continue this way, but you know the 
situation is so unstable it really depends on the political will on the government because 
currently we don’t have like strong institutions judiciary and we are dependent on political 
persons on particular persons like in the ministry and we are collaborating with them and 
we are involved with the, like me personally in the assessing of some textbooks and then 
evaluation and then giving recommendations and improving the text books and I hope that 
the next textbooks for the 7th grade will be better than they were before, so far we have the 
opportunity, so far things are improving in this sense, but you never know, like the changes 
that these people go from the ministry you don’t know whom to talk to so it’s not the us 
where you have trump but there are institutions and you still have these solid institutions 
and if there are many trumps around then...so in this sense it is very difficult to anticipate 
what will happen so I still hope that when I look at the, like there are many positive changes 
not only in this since but in the broader sense like we are now seeing like 10 and 11 days 
there are civic protests outside so the public changed and the sentiments and priorities of 
the citizens are changing so I think they are more civically active more ready, more open 
minded more open to embrace the diversity as well because the group of people who are 
outside now are very diverse, like they have different political taste or preferences and they 
have, and some of them are homophobes some of them are LGBT and human rights 
activists and so on and they are kind of united around the same cause and they know how to 
fight about rights so I think that the new generation which comes will be more tolerant and 
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more acceptable of the diversity and so yea, I hope that it will be better, but still it is really 
difficult to anticipate anything because it depends a lot on who’ll be the government and 
how the parliament will look after 2020 and I hope that we will have these proportional 
elections and we will have this diversity.   
  
 
Appendix B 
Interview 2 
Interviewee: Marina Elbakidze 
Interviewer: Logan Hulsey 
Logan: Have you personally done any work with the Adjaran Muslim Community? 
Marina: Not directly, but separately with Muslims...in Adjara but I'm working many years 
in this NGO and in different times we have different kind of projects and activities in the 
region so I had a chance to meet people in the frame of discussing of problems of religion 
minorities and in general minorities and during these discussions we had also Muslims 
minorities and Adjaran Muslims too.  and somehow, I had some connection with some 
people why. Mean young researchers who were working with these people maybe 5-6 years 
ago working on this issue, so I have some communication with this topic I mean some 
contact with this topic and these people but I never worked personally with them.  but I 
know this. 
Logan: ok but you have worked with other religious minorities...  
Marina: yes, in general with minorities so including them, yes. 
Logan: 01:48 great, um so if I can I want to ask about the differences between the minority 
situation with UNM and GD, so for example...is the GD govt has it created a better 
situation for minorities than under Saakashvili? or is it better than under Saakashvili?  
Marina: I think that they did not create it, I mean the new govt, GD, something new or 
better but in general, it my opinion of course, it’s in general, they created a more 
democratic case in some understanding, and in this case it became better or minorities, it 
does not mean that they I mean particularly know how to solve or care about this issue but 
at least they are not using in a bad way this minority issue,  During Saakashvili it was 
more...if there were some problems, the solution was more strict, more how to say... 
Logan: heavy handed?  
Marina: yes, heavy handed, no discussion, just boom, this should be done in this way and 
that’s all.  and if you’re talking about some changes, it’s not heavy handed but still there are 
problems, in general, the condition is better.  
Logan: 03:52 so more democratic?  
Marina: yes, I think so, I mean not because I have some political preferences but I mean 
with what I have seen before and what I see today, this is how I feel.   
Logan: 04:10 is this apparent with the minorities you work with?...err like can you see this 
in your work? 
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Marina: 04:22 yes, as you know I’m working every month...I am looking in whole Georgia 
as it’s not very detailed but I’m trying to follow how it’s going, how processes are going in 
whole Georgia regarding minorities in Georgia especially in places where they live...more 
densely populated.  what I see is different cases with how previous govt is working and 
how new one is working and even if we talk about, you have in SJ and I think you know 
that in ww2 the population, so called Muslim Meskhetians were deported from this place 
during soviet times and in the 90s there was a big discussion about repatriation of these 
people, people who want, they were sent to central Asia and some of them wanted to come 
back and a very small community came and they all...even the declaration policy was from 
Georgian side, in 90s it was crazy, it takes long time to describe these processes and it was 
not so important but during Saakashvili we had a law 06:25 that we were responsible for 
these people who wanted to come back, we should solve their problems, give them 
somewhere to live, etc. but even it was an official policy but in reality it was very hard for 
these people. even today if [???] 06:50  the new govt they do not have citizenship, of course 
there is some problems, some real legacy problems, they have not done some things in a 
proper way, I mean these Meskhetians I mean their grandchildren and great grandchildren 
who came back, but looking at these I mean how was this negotiation with govt and with 
these people and local govt and central govt I could see openly very clear that govt did not 
want to give them citizenship, there was different, I mean during Saakashvili, different 
barriers, somehow to stop this process, so it was declaration for I mean...European 
structures, etc. for international for of course we are democratic country, we are ready to get 
them back to receive them, but in reality it was very hard for these people, today I can say 
that its it is not...there are not solved all these problems of these people but what I see, at 
least I did not hear maybe there is, there is not...I did not know examples regarding how 
govt officials are trying just to...to give them obstacles, not to...to make this way of 
returning I mean as...complicated as possible, it was what it was before and during 
Saakashvili’s, and I mean before too but if you compare these two during this new govt I 
did not hear these examples maybe because they are not trying to come back because they 
are finally I mean understand that this society and this country don’t want them or 
something different...sorry, I’m talking a long time about it but it is one case that you can 
compare this situations, yes and even you know these cases in regarding the chela and all 
these mosques, so I’m not going to tell you, I think the same problems are in both 
governments have the same problems but if we compare cases in this case, this now it’s less 
how to say violent or brutal, less brutal, these guys are using less brutal ways, it does not 
mean they are not using but it is a bit lower . 
Logan: 10:11 so in my research I’ve noticed that there’s a pattern of for example Muslims 
want to build a mosque and the govt says ok but they do a similar situation with the 
Meskhetians where they make it complicated and they kind make it where like you need to 
understand that we don’t want you to do this but they don’t say that. 
Marina: you mean again about Muslims, they want to build mosques, or in general, because 
the problems also have Catholics, and I mean all of the religious minorities how to say are 
not ...are in an unequal situation to compare with the GOC, I mean with Armenians.  their 
mentalities their people, these politicians are not declaring what they think but what I see all 
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but one part of them is, you know we are a Christian, orthodox Christian country so of 
course it is natural that we need to have more rights than others, even they cannot 
understand that it’s not I mean democratic or fair or that it should be equal . 11:32 ...and 
there were some examples regarding Catholics and some Armenians...[describes how 
Armenian church is different] one is that there is a dispute and discussion regarding the 
churches between Armenian and Georgian church between who belongs this or that church 
and las time there was this dispute in SJ regarding two churches, I don’t remember the 
names of the villages now...there are two old churches, they are ruins really, and they 
wanted to rebuild them but one question is of course if this is a cultural heritage you can’t 
touch and you have to receive permission from institutional who is looking and ruling this 
process, this is one issue, and they are not very...I mean Georgians Armenians who are 
people living in Caucasus they think that ok this is in our village, these ruins so we can just 
rebuild and its good and we are good guys and we are doing some good things but ok now 
they know that they have to get permission, but after this...it happens a few times when 
someone is talking about the building or restoration of this church, again there is a question, 
then who is...whom belongs this church and then again there is this discussion that it is not 
yours its ours and again so, there are different reasons why this process...why it is not so 
easy to build a new one or to rebuild the old one, it’s because of the law etc. but second is 
that Georgians are not ready even everything is regarding the law everything is ok but then 
it is again a question, why do these minorities have to build their churches, why their 
mosques, etc. because we are orthodox etc. etc., yea this is in the mentality so govt also 
plays some tries to play some between these two groups to make it more worse, what they 
are doing today.  and there was also a few cases with Catholics in SJ they wanted to build a 
totally new one, just to avoid these disputes over who belongs this church because these 
disputes can be between Catholics if there are ruins and its...you never know who built 
them in the middle centuries  this church but all participants think that they do it, maybe 
they do it together, but now they pretended that it was done by Georgians, by Armenians, 
by Catholics, etc. and they wanted to build new one in an empty place and again it was a 
problem and with Muslims there are more problems because Muslim...and in different 
places in Georgia and you know about the Azizye [mosque] in Batumi about which it was 
ruined in soviet times but also there were many small buildings mosques and in many 
villages they wanted to build or to use and yes they had problems, it’s not so easy usually 
what they are doing they have their buying houses or using someone’s house just to use it 
as a place where they can pray .  I am talking in General...and also there is a problem at new 
one in Shida Kartli...in Shida Kartli there are Georgians and you know after independence 
Georgia became more religious I mean in behavior in many churches are rebuilt and you if 
you traveling Georgia its very different from soviet times, in soviet times there were just a 
few churches in everywhere but one or 2 in all regions which was I mean functioning as a 
church and today you see old ones functioning as a church and new ones in every corner 
etc. and in Shida Kartli there was also in everywhere these old churches and there are some 
old churches which were rebuilt and used now GOC using, their lives I mean it’s very 
active there are all these religion people etc. and they are how to say very they became 
more bigger I mean society community of this religion...church and in Shida Kartli. From 
90s we also have some eco migrants from Adjara I means Georgians they were Georgian s 
they were also ??18:00  a small population but they left in 90s but it’s not about stories is 
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not about this ok and some Adjarans I mean people Muslims of course moved from Adjara 
as they moved to SJ they moved to Shida Kartli near Kutaisi or some this place and when 
they moved the on the all these old churches they were just empty but of course they didn’t 
use these churches but step by step these old churches became functioning and now 
orthodox church is now working there and trying to make they somehow privatize...some 
lands some agricultural paces all these buildings bought some empty houses from their 
owners or idk they have this...they want to control this like in the middle century not church 
but some rich high level [feudalists]...19:34 and these people they have some conflicts there 
is a tension between Adjarans and this GOC these priests etc. ...and there is a tension 
between this and two days ago and they are sort of trying to convert these people they are 
saying you know you are Georgians and it’s not right to be Muslim etc. and somehow 
they’re trying to, some of the Adjarans decided to leave this place and to move again back 
idk...this is something new but in 90s it was a one big how to say...they want to switch all 
these Muslims to Christianity because our moment was so...you were in past you’re 
Georgians you were in past Christians and you are now Muslims because you were under 
control from turkey for 3 centuries and it was something...this is the reason why you 
became Muslim etc. and now it’s time to come back to...and some people have I mean some 
families had problems because young generation wanted just to be part of this Christian 
society the traditional older they had different vision and even this political or some vision 
make some ...problems inside families and its maybe not big because it’s not so very...so I 
think for them it’s not so easy sometimes and they don’t like idealism but it’s not the right 
question to ask someone to ask what is their religion but in Georgia so are you orthodox? 
do you have the cross? and they are just afraid to hear this question they prefer just to say 
so a few of them told me when someone is talking and they are ??22:24   
Logan: so I guess my next question refers to that so yea so he church obviously has a lot of 
power and wants to convert so my question is, like where is the government why doesn’t 
the govt...let’s put it this way I guess an ideal kind of liberal democracy the govt would 
make certain protections for these minority groups and say ok you can’t infringe on their 
right to be Muslim, you have to build their...or not even just them, you should let them 
build their church etc.  I guess my question is why doesn’t the govt do that? why doesn’t 
the govt step in and make these protections? 
Marina: so in this case we need to talk about the relationship between govt and church and 
the role of the GOC because the church as I mentioned people became at least formally so 
religion and many of them has their own...someone in the church who you are...ok you 
know there is a community in the church and all people in this community have their own 
priest who is...when you have to tell everything about what you have done, like a 
confession...ok it doesn’t matter I mean people who are religious...[goes off track]24:57 
church plays an important role in our society and for govt and for politicians it is important 
to have a good relation with the church so it’s a like an it’s also a plays a political role in 
our society I mean church this is why govt officials are trying, I mean we have a secular 
state but still this church plays an important role so they are trying somehow to...I mean 
people from govt because if the church can say something against some politicians etc. then 
it means that people who are in this church and if this priest is important then he says that 
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no before the election that ah somehow not directly that you have to vote that this is good 
guy and this guy is bad then you are losing your voters so this is a political game if to say 
shortly and in this political game the church is also playing an important role so they have 
to I mean officials have to make some reverence to the church .   
Logan: 26:35 what was, so I know GD and the church get along pretty well, what was 
Saakashvili’s relation with the church?  
Marina: it was somehow the same but it was during Saakashvili when at the time or maybe 
it was during Shevardnadze...but at least there was and still we have a law that the GOC 
receives money from the budget and every year it is higher and higher and its unbelievable I 
mean state budget and the church which is separate and they get money from the...and 
during Saakashvili they had a good relationship and even the church was included in the 
budget and no one was checking it was how to say there are some tax services and special 
kind of services and all organizations have to I mean report how they spent money except 
the church but it’s also not very I mean logical because if you receive money from the 
budget you are responsible to report what you spend and how you spend I mean this is also 
a sign how...and this is also...so if you officials and politicians just giving to church this 
rights it means that the church also with something I mean giving something some relations 
I give you something and you give me also something not because they are very religious 
and they think that church and then there were discussion in society I mean why only GOC 
receives money from budget and then I don’t remember the year but there was created a 
new law and according this law other religions also have money from the budget but it was 
after the budget why only in democratic country and in secular state why this and then it 
changed a bit but so and church is enough very rich institution and have influence in society 
and this is so why govt is somehow politicians um yea trying to have good relationship with 
church but opposition is very critical on this stage they criticize very much church but when 
they were I mean national movements they were in the government...when they were ruling 
party they also had religion but they are now criticize but yea, its I agree with a lot of things 
to criticize the church I am also critical but they are using this again as a political issue not 
because they are... 
Logan: 30:11 so what, what would happen if, and just in your opinion, err, how could the 
state kind of distance itself from the church a little more do you think so you said there's 
this kind of reliant relationship, what if, err how could the state become less reliant on the 
church, how could the state become stronger?     
Marina: is a good question when the state will be stronger when it becomes 
stronger...[grammatical question]...then the state can somehow make less...not 
communicate very so very close with church but how our state will become stronger I mean 
it’s a huge question I mean its now what you see on the streets its now this issue that the 
state is not so strong and weak I mean it’s complicated and yea, because the opinion of 
society depends I mean some in some part of our society depends on what is church saying 
so...we are weak state what is problem why govt is trying to have some relationship with 
church and I do not have answer is, it is long discussion I mean long and clear answer   . 
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Logan: 32:18 so would you say that these issues with minorities...obviously the church is 
against t like Catholics building a place and the govt is so reliant on the church that is 
probably a big problem that they haven’t helped these minorities... 
Marina: yes, this is serious problem yes... 
Logan: so, would you attribute or would you say that these problems happen because of 
state weakness, do you think? 
Marina: do you mean all these problems with minorities?  
Logan: yea, right... 
Marina: 33:27 its one because state is weak and second one that the mentality of our society 
is still idk how to say not enough mature and in Georgian society what I see during the 
years in the 90s were a bit crazy that these Georgians and it’s not only in Georgian society 
but it depends on how much it is what I’m going to say now...Georgians still think that 
uh...Georgians in society has to have more rights because this is, I mean...because Georgia 
belongs to Georgians and right Georgian is a Georgian who is I mean orthodox Christian 
and even Georgians Muslims there is something not right there is something wrong with 
them I think when we met first and I think this is a problem of mentality still these are 
unequal if you...even this all its not...I’m talking not whole society because there is very 
healthy maybe they think I’m not healthy my mentality, I mean young generation even old 
generation but whose thinking that everyone in a normal country has to be equal and its etc. 
but still in Georgian society there are visions that people are different and they have 
different status and regarding their religion and ethnicity and people have different rights in 
our mentality   what I wanted to say and if you are sexual minority it’s the worst thing, like 
religion ok but its, but I have to underline again that its very small and this active group 
who is against and maybe you’ve followed in these last days and months they were against 
this pride of LGBT and we have a few organizations its uh, one is Georgian march...and 
another one, there are a few, but a more active one the union of orthodox parents, yes you 
know this, and really they are really aggressive and sometimes they say but we are not 
killing them, they have right to live but don’t show it, lets...what they are saying that they 
should sit at home not be visible in society etc. that at least I am happy that this part is very 
small this organization who is saying this...but yes we have, I mean this radical groups also 
but really they are really small, but people who are in the middle their opinion...if 
something happens then their opinion depends on I mean I call it middle average person, 
someone from the street and he is open maybe to receive I mean some very...democratic 
values and some radicals but it depends who is working with them who is saying at this 
moment this space in this moment then people are switching to or that place so why it is 
important so maybe the biggest part in society is maybe not aggressive but neutral but when 
something happens and people somehow make decisions what is their position and it 
depends very much on what these active groups are saying even this discussion that is in the 
street on the tv regarding this what happened in 20 of July I mean this Russian guy who was 
in parliament etc. for me it’s really to say it’s nothing so important to say I mean it depends 
on which side you are analyzing this process because he was invited just as a part of all this 
conference I mean and no one stopped him on the border then he was invited on this whole 
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and as a rule then the head of this organization as I understand someone told him let’s take 
this place as I am saying you maybe we sit in this room or that and then it started something 
really crazy process I think it was mistake from GD and...but as national movement they 
knew all this information, why they did not stop? because I read all this information that 
this event will be held in Georgia on 11 of June because for my report I also told that this 
Christian I mean how they call it assembly they will be in Georgia and of course all 
members of parliament they knew not society, I had this information because for my job not 
because I...ha-ha...and people they are interested on this issues and but opposition was 
informed of course because its parliaments decision and opposition is also some members 
of the opposition from the opposition and from majority they and few from this and few 
from this they are members of this assembly they have been in different countries they have 
seen and they knew all this I mean participants and they said nothing not stopped I mean all 
this process they could say why its good idea we call in Georgia and his Russian occupant 
etc. what they are saying now and suddenly they start...but what I wanted to say they just 
used all this situations for their political agenda and I was talking about people from the 
street and they send this message oh something very bad happened, this Russian occupant is 
now sitting in our parliament in the chair in the head of the parliament they just started all 
this game and even people who know this they cannot even say that you know all...then all 
started repeating this Russian occupant that this Russian...[takes phone call]... 
Logan: 42:56 ok ill just ask my last question if you don’t mind yea so my question is how 
do you think things might get better so what I mean is for the religious minorities, how 
might things get biter for them? what changes could be made? 
Marina: it’s one is that state should become more strong and the question how to make 
them strong it’s not too long story and also state and some organizations I mean we have to 
I mean the mentality I mentioned about the mentality and values is a problem in our society 
it does not mean that we are totally crazy but if we want to make something better the 
mentality should change and of course question is how to do this and nothing will happen 
but it’s different how to say ways I mean some...some organization has to work in this 
direction, young generation has to get good education not only something, I think things are 
better and better it’s a young generation is more open etc., what we need if answer shortly 
it’s to change the mentality and to make state more strong but its same question how to do 
this and its of course ling discussion there are ways of course to change but someone I 
mean some organization or structures or institution has to work in this direction, if you 
leave everything as it is then do nothing then it became worse and worse than it was even 
this programs, these higher education exchange between young people when people are 
traveling in different countries they can see different people it we have enough different 
people but still it’s a different lifestyle etc. it makes some changes, good changes I think, it 
helps of people in young generation in old generation too but its more realistic than to 
offer...to education in different countries to young generation like I mentioned about young 
but old people so are changing their mentality that does not mean that they...  
 
  
Appendix C 
Interview 3 
Interviewee: Tatia Kalitozishvili 
Interviewer: Logan Hulsey 
Logan: ok, sorry, um 
Tatia: I did my master at Ilia state university, So, I studied sociology, but I had two elective 
courses in anthropology and I guess that ethnography and anthropology is the field that I 
really would like to investigate deeply, so that’s why I decided to conduct ethnography 
research, and I visited one of the multicultural villages in Kakheti. A It is called Gombori 
where Iranians, Azeris, and Georgians, and Russians live together peacefully...00:47Â yea 
it’s a village people just do not speak about it and do not know about it.  This is a very 
beautiful road from Tbilisi to Telavi, shorter one.  And this village is there, exactly.  And 
the road divides it into two parts.  Thee are Muslims, Shia Muslims, and Georgian 
Christians, and yea these Russians, these polish people live there also, because this was a 
military base under Soviet Union and earlier, and there are some Russians and there are 
some military base and some multi story buildings.  and so, this village is very different, 
and I based on these shared religious traditions, these Muslims and Georgians have, I tried 
to investigate their peaceful coexistence there.  And it was really cool.  I observed their 
everyday life and took part in their religious rituals, and celebrations and it was really cool.  
It was a rely cool experience, I gained many friends there, these Muslims, and even now I 
very often visit them and we have some kind of good relations. 
Logan: that’s cool, I actually also studied anthropology, but back in America 
Tatia: That’s cool, it helps you understand yourself and other people better 
Logan: so... 
Tatia: I wrote a tiny piece of, about this coexistence and this is the coauthored article, and I 
can share this with you. 
Logan: Sure! I'd love to, um sorry so you said this, in this village, this was your master's 
thesis? 
Tatia: [nods] 
Logan: ah, ok, so can you tell me, um about the work you did in Adjara a little bit? 02:47  
Tatia: yea, so we...so 2 kinds of work I did there, so I worked for the project which 
promotes democracy and in the regional cities we often conduct some interviews and some 
discussion about the ongoing political situations, and there in Batumi, I and my small team 
of 3 interview these political party members, members of different political parties; mainly 
the opposition.  But the Georgian dream as well.  And so, these talks were about politics, 
and you know, when you speak to people you can understand more about the culture and 
their environment.  So, I know some of these politicians there because two times we were 
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there and very often with students and professors we gave discussions there.  And another 
thing I told you about these impressions I got between these Muslims and [inaudible] is that 
I was involved in the ethnobotanical research and during two summers we.  So, a student 
from the university of Florida, the PhD student and me visited this...various villages and 
spent time there during a week or more.  We lived with them and shared their lives and 
lifestyle and everyday life...04:22 we conducted some interviews about plants and about 
botany, but as we spent so much time there, we had very...talks, about various issues 
and...04:34 mainly this research was about this ethnobotany...use of plants.  
Logan: oh, so it’s like how they use them in medicine and stuff? that’s really cool  
Tatia: for food and for different reasons 
Logan: oh wow, that's really cool...04:51 So, I guess um, I'm interested to hear about your 
time with these families, and these uh, mixed families and stuff, um, I guess...05:14 so you 
said that the Muslim Georgians truly feel themselves Georgian you said. 
Tatia: truly Muslim Georgians?  
Logan: err, right so in Adjara, I mean their Georgianness, there’s no question about this 
right? like they completely feel Georgian?  
Tatia: yea, they feel that they are Georgians but they want to explain this to Christian 
Georgians that they are full Georgians, complete Georgians, to prove this, so they want to 
make other people learn that this thing that they are Muslims, does not make trouble and 
should not make trouble for them to be considered as Georgians.  so other people think that, 
I think other Georgians who are Christians at the same time, sometimes for them it’s 
difficult to understand that as someone is Muslim, he or she is not complete Georgians, 
because for most of us, the majority of us, Christianity is very strict indicator to...06:23 
believe, or think, or consider someone is Georgian or not.  And these Muslims really feel 
that they are part of Georgia and part of this state and nation but they want...they feel a little 
but, not abandoned, but they feel strange and weird because of this, because of their 
religion, and they want to explain this "no, we are Muslims, but we are Georgian" this 
narrative works I think. 
Logan: right, interesting, so are they, like...what...06:58 what are they trying to say 
basically, are they trying to say, like Georgians don't have to be Christians. 
Tatia: no, no  
Logan: like, uh, I guess what I'm asking is like, how do they prove their 
Georgianness...07:16 what are they doing, are they...is it in conversations? 
Tatia: yea 
Logan: ...like where they're saying "no I'm Georgian even though I'm Muslim or are they 
protesting are they, are there organizations trying to... 
Tatia: so they, in ...I think in the conversations and even in their everyday life in there, so 
they speak a lot and share their experiences with their neighbors, you know, especially 
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village life is part of this informal uh, informal types of relationships, where neighbors are 
very close friends, and every day they cooperate and do some things together.  Like they 
have shared coffee or dinner so they have more friendlier relationship...I think that in their 
conversations everyday experiences is like this, and these young people speak more often 
about this.  To be frank, I think that...so this issue is important for them but they don't like 
to underline a lot and speak constantly about it.  I remember while having our interviews 
when I asked their religion, they would say Muslim but they did not tend to discuss this 
issue deeply.  Btu when you spend more, a lot of time with them you get this, you feel this 
situation, and its natural.  For example, I, last time I was in Batumi, I was in an ice cream 
parlor and there were young, so school students, maybe high school students that I could 
listen to them because their table was very close with us and they were just to find their 
ancestors their grandparents, they love their religion they want to practice this religion but 
it’s not their fault, so the Turkey invaded them and it’s their tradition and we should not be 
angry with them we are Christians but we should respect their religiosity and its nit their 
fault...09:28Â this is because of this invasion.  They talk like this...09:33 they want to 
respect this, but at the same time justify why they are Muslims.... 
Logan: 09:41 so, so they feel like they're Muslim, like but it’s not their fault that they're 
Muslim... 
Tatia: yea, exactly, but these young people mainly, and in this older generations really, but 
they think that it’s not their fault, turkey invaded them, but it is their tradition, but it is their 
history and they don’t want to abandon this and they don’t want to change this.  and ok, so 
one of the lovely grandmothers told me that I'm Muslim, but my son is Christian because 
her...10:15Â his wife was...before he got married was Christian and he changed this 
religion, he converted from Muslim to Christianity and its ok to me, she told me.  She was 
very lovely and fluffy woman, and she told me like this.  But she wanted to maintain and 
keep her religion.  It was not a...so what is good is that in one family you can feel, see this 
diversity. 
Logan:  yea, yea that's very interesting 
Tatia: but mostly, it is young people really most of them are Christian, and you know in 
Adjara, and I'm sure you have been right? 
Logan: yea 
Tatia: there is Keda, there is three municipalities, Keda Shuakhevi, and Khulo and in Khulo 
most of them are Muslim including these younger people, these young people, so some of 
them are orthodox, but most of them are Muslim, and in Shuakhevi, fewer, and in Keda, 
fewer and fewer people are Muslim, so when you go into the mountains. 
Logan: yea, like the deeper you go yea...11:43 so what I guess, what I was trying to ask, so 
what it sounds like to me is that these Muslim try and prove their identity in a more in a 
private space, do they try and prove it in a public space.  Like for example, um...so...so 
what I'm saying for example is like, building a mosque basically is kind of their expression 
in a public space saying like... 
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Tatia: mmhm [in agreement] 
Logan: ...saying like ok we we're here, we need to be accepted and I think that is where the 
issues come in, is when they try and prove themselves in a public space would you say this 
is true? 
Tatia: yea, so they have this public spaces, so it is very interesting that in the villages, 
which are not very tiny and very small villages, they have these mosques but you know 
what is the difference, they uh, I think are not allowed or do not try to build the real 
mosque, which the construction is... 
Logan: right, yea 
Tatia: but houses are converted into mosques 
Logan: ah yea I read about this 
Tatia: it’s very interesting, one of the houses is converted into a mosque and they go and 
pray there, and all or most of the villages have this tiny thing, for example in what I told 
you about Gombori, uh Muslims there also have this...also wanted very much to build a 
mosque, but this village is very poor and they were not allow and financially of course, they 
are not able...they need some...financial help.  But these Muslims say that these Georgians 
do not let us build a mosque and they converted one of the houses into a mosque and they 
call this a mosque.  And in Adjara and in many villages, I have seen these mosques, so 
there's just an ordinary house you can't guess that it is a mosque until the locals tell you that 
it is a mosque.  and there are some.  
Logan: is this a new thing? that they've turned these houses into mosques or has this been 
happening for like 100 years or something? 
Tatia: I don't want to...I don't know, I really don't know and I don't want to give you 
misinformation.  But now, really, some of them are renovated and some of them has some 
very modern um...piece of construction and things like this.  They go there and really pray 
and use this public space, but they...for example in Gombori it’s not about Adjara, but in 
Gombori people feel a little bit worried and sorry that they don't have a real mosque and 
they have that, just this house.  Maybe in Adjara they also they have this...worries and 
concerns, but they, they really don’t feel good that they don’t have this.  But I'm pretty sure.  
So men are more courageous in speaking about this, I think.  If you ask about this, they will 
tell more, and this is just the impression of just what they say.  As we walked in the 
villages, and they really have these house, and this is public right?  
Logan: so? 
Tatia: converted houses, so houses converted into mosques. 
Logan: [tells story of chela] ...15:49 so I guess next I was just going to ask, just kind of 
about, um, how do you, how do the Muslims feel about the government? Do they feel that 
the government is something with them or something against them? do they feel that they 
can trust the government to help them basically? 
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Tatia: umm...it is a bit difficult question really, because in Georgia, even Georgians do not 
feel like the government is not on their side or something or that they cannot trust the 
government every time we request to...we want to remove and eliminate the government, 
especially in the Muslim community I think maybe these kind of impression are 
stronger...16:42Â so people...but, I, I'm...I don't know exactly, what happens there, what 
kind of perception and attitude they have.  Because we have never talked about this.  But, 
this...for example, based on Gombori, that the government does not help us build this 
mosque and this means that they don't have much expectations and trust in the government.  
But it...like really, it’s my impression, and I really have not talked a lot about this.  
Logan: ok, um...so like, for example...so you're saying just in general, trust in the 
government in Georgia is just very low.  If you know... who do you think that uh they 
would go to if they had like some issues, would they go to government authorities? or 
would they try and handle the issue on their own, like a cultural leader or something, or 
like... 
Tatia: so there are some um local representatives of the government in two 
main...representative are important, so the sakrebulo, which is their elected deputies there 
and work for the region and the mayor of this...so if they have this...some problems and 
things, some public problems or in their neighborhood or something, I think first of all, they 
go to this local representative, this local mayor, or each village has their representative of 
their local government.  I mean briefly, they go to this local government and try to handle 
this problem here.  so in the...so for example if something happens in Keda, they want to 
first of all, to discuss this with their local...not in Batumi, or who they have in Keda, in this 
region, the local representative, and then in Batumi...so Batumi is more of a center for 
them, so all of these municipalities have their local representative and maybe for them, I 
mean this sakrebulo and this mayor are their main things for this local... 
Logan: ok, and uh, do you think that this person would kind of represent them, I mean 
would it be a Muslim person, you think or would it be, err, like um... 
Tatia: Christian? 
Logan: ...well yea 
Tatia: maybe they have some Muslims...but do you know this case that in, uh, Adjara has 
its own government or something...19:42 autonomous! yea and there some or one of the 
men or someone was elected from the Muslim community and Georgians protested this, 
and now this man maintains his post there and these Georgians protested, Christians 
protested this, a lot! but I mean on the local level I mean the local sakrebulo in Keda or 
something, maybe they have but I'm not sure, you know one interesting thing happened on 
my, while having interview with some of the...members of patriots alliance, patriots 
alliance is the political party which is pro-Russian.  
Logan: ah, yea, I've heard of them.  
Tatia:  and they are in the parliament, this patriots alliance is in the parliament and they are 
very pro-Russian and many people...so these young people and mainly Georgians who want 
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this western development or something, of course they hate this patriots alliance...We had 
an interview there with them and one of the interesting thing, so one man was very 
interesting, he was a teacher from Khulo, who came in Batumi to meet us there and he said 
something like this that, he tries to make this patriots alliance office stronger in Khulo, and 
he said something like this that he tries to explain this patriots alliance...so every time they 
speak about this Christianity and how this religion is very important, Christianity is very 
important for Georgia, but he said he was Muslim, this man from Khulo, and he told us 
that...how much he tries to persuade these local people who are Muslims to not pay 
attention to this patriot alliance that Christianity is important and join the party and support 
the party, that we are all Georgians and we should not differentiate people according to 
their religiosity.  Ok and this party leaders and think that Christianity is very important, but 
you should not pay attention to this because being Georgian is more important than 
religiosity. And he was Muslim who was this man who was a representative of this patriot’s 
alliance.  So you will...so this is just one case but you will see a lot of interesting things like 
this, maybe this happens in the other parties (parts?) I don't know.  
Logan: yea, ok interesting, are there...22:28 so in like, Adjara for example ...there aren't any 
different political parties, right? it’s all just Georgian Dream or UNM? or patriot alliance? 
are there any other? 
Tatia: yea! there should have been some other parties...European Georgia...some parties, 
but these regional offices are really weak generally, especially in the mountains, so for 
example in Telavi, in Batumi, there are some parties and they really work, but in Khulo and 
in higher than Khulo, they...the parties are weak, they don't have offices or something, they 
have just someone who is maybe a member of a party who probably works and just before 
the elections tries to persuade other people to vote for them or something. 
Logan: ok, so it’s more of like a...err, elections are more of like a personal kind of level ok.  
Tatia: yea! yea, exactly.  
Logan: ok, um...23:33 So I wanted to go back to um, how you were talking about how the, 
um the government doesn't really want to anger anybody.  Do you happen to have any idea 
of maybe why they wouldn't, like why don't they enforce the law as you said, why...why are 
they trying to please everybody? 
Tatia: Because, because of one thing, that they don't want to lose power.  And in Georgia it 
was just once when the government was changed by the election...so elections here are very 
important, every time this GD tries to attract more and more votes and that's why.  So and, 
you, you know, we are the kind of people who elect the president with 96% of the overall 
votes, so the leaders are very important here and I want this tendency to be changed and I 
would like this to be changed but...at present it is very true...not to lose votes and not to lose 
support, this is Whats very important...on the parliamentary election of 2016, GD got 
constitutional majority in parliament so they...and they changed the constitution, and in 
2017, they...there was a local election and on the local level, all of these seats were taken by 
GD, most of the seats, in all the sakrebulo and everywhere...in the presidential election, we 
elected this GD...so she was an independent, but supported by GD, so it was a lie, so she 
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was not independent, this Zurabishvili.  And now...during these demonstrations, do you 
know what I was thinking about?...we had bi election a month ago and in Tbilisi 
Mtatsminda there was a parliamentary bi election, and including in Khulo there was a bi 
election, in many regions so we elected some of the members of sakrebulo and mayors of 
different regions, so more than around...maybe 10 places there was this bi election.  So in 
every place GD won, in all of these places and now in a month, we are having these 
demonstrations...this is controversial, like we elect GD people and at the same time we 
don’t want GD in the government and we have these demonstrations, so it’s strange but the 
election is going on and in the elections GD works very well, they have coordinators and 
try to mobilize their voters and these different problems are actual, so it’s really, really hard 
situation.  
Logan: oh, wow, ok 26:40 would you say this is um...did this similar situation happen with 
UNM? or...it’s a similar kind of culture...a similar kind of trend of... 
Tatia: yes... 
Logan: trying to get full majority 
Tatia: yea, it is absolutely the same because UNM also had this constitutional majority, and 
so GD took the same path, it’s a tendency. 
Logan: ah ok, so it’s not something unique to Georgian Dream... 
Tatia: yea  
Logan: it’s just they happen to be in power now...ok...27:33Â so what kind of...and this 
might be a difficult question, but what, what do you think would be necessary to...to change 
it...like, um...so, obviously you want more, or everyone would want the government to 
follow the constitution, to be, to you know, have more competition, to be more uh, I guess 
more of a liberal democracy, how do you think this might happen? um, err do you have any 
ideas of how this might happen... 
Tatia: yea, I really, I have thought a lot about this and I have my own recipe or something.  
So here, in Georgia I think that poverty is the major problem and I think that when this 
poverty will be caught and dealt, we will have more...we will...so...this problem, this kind 
of problem will be automatically solved by themselves.  Because when, so poverty...in the 
regions, and even in Tbilisi, so I took part in the uh, research, so before the bi-election of 
Mtatsminda with some students and me were included, were involved in the sociological 
research investigating the problems of Mtatsminda, of people living in Mtatsminda district 
and you know, this is a part of Tbilisi, which is very central and property is very expensive 
there, and you can't imagine how poor people are, even on Mtatsminda, in the center of 
Tbilisi, and I'm pretty sure that in the suburbs and in other places the situation is worse and 
maybe...you can't feel this because I think that even in the cafes the same people go, so 
generally people are very poor and I visited one village in the municipality of Kobuleti and 
I visited the school there and students told me that this was the classroom of Geography, 
and there were no maps, no globes, nothing in the, in their room.  There was just one globe 
for the room, and I asked them if they used this globe to see the ocean or to see the other 
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countries and they said no because it is broke and damaged and the teachers did not let 
them to use this.  Can you imagine this? So, I think that poverty is the major problem and 
when this will be caught, I think that...and people have opportunities, this kind of things 
will become better...probably.  
Logan: ok, interesting...30:52 so you answered this whenever we first got here but I was 
going to ask like, do you think it’s going to get better, or do you think it’s getting worse, 
like just the kind of...these issues, so like as they are now, where do you see them going?  
Tatia: hmm, I think that still it’s very slowly, but things are becoming better, I think.  Life is 
better now than 10 or 15 years ago, there was no...institutions and things like this before 
UNM and really UNM started really well like they created this...state institutions and things 
and now under GD, I really think that what happened this last, yesterday, not the day 
before, yesterday, this force and this beating was...under this government people really feel 
free to speak up their minds, more than UNM, but, you know, we really need to think about 
this recent event because it was violent and this was something that UNM was criticized for 
and GD did the same, but till now really people feel more free.  and I think that this civil 
society is more...is a bit stronger than under UNM, and people still...but on the other hand 
this lari is sinking, a lot...compared to the dollar, I'm pretty sure you know this, the dollar is 
becoming more and more expensive here and our currency...we have this problem... 
Logan: yea, like the currency is weakening... 
Tatia: yea, and prices are becoming more expensive, all the goods and it’s really hard for 
people, and economically people maybe feel a bit worse, but still I want to believe that 
things are going forward, but really living here is really...did you know one of the 
foreigners...I met a guy from the university of Amsterdam and he told me something a little 
bit disappointing, that Georgia is very interesting country, very good country, he told me, 
but Georgia is very good for two things.  What are these two things I asked, and he said: its 
traveling and conducting research....and not for living! ...it’s hard, but I do believe things 
will be better.  and I am happy that this young generation, feel free and they are more 
courageous.  Many people go abroad and come back and get the education and they want to 
use this here in Georgia and I think this will really influence things.  
Logan: alright um, I think...yea that's everything... 
  
Appendix D 
Interview 4 
Interviewee: Sophie Zviadadze PhD 
Interviewer: Logan Hulsey 
Logan: ok so um hello um, could you start by telling me um what is your expertise in this 
area 
Sophie: In Adjara or... 
Logan: yes, in Adjara 
Sophie: or in particular in the mosque issue 
Logan: oh, uh just Adjara 
Sophie: so, when I started researching Adjara the main question of my research was to 
investigate the transformation of religiosity after independence...after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and what happens to Muslim identity or Muslim religiosity. but after my third 
research I have discovered that the main problem of Muslim Adjarans are 
acknowledgement from Georgian society of their identity as full Georgians and this 
religious identity was the second level and the first was on what they always mention was 
that we are full Georgians, we are Georgians we are not Tatars we are not Turks, they 
always make these border line between Georgian and turkey...we are Georgians.  but they 
have some particular cohesion from Muslim identity and Georgianness because you know 
that the main trend or main narrative of Georgian national identity is that being Georgian 
means being Christian, and so parallel to these narratives they feel very comfortable with 
this identity but they feel somehow marginality(?) because they think of these two 
perceptions or that these two identities have no contradictions and they always.  They 
waiting that Georgian Christian society will accept that they’re Muslim identity. and that 
new mosque construction is one of the crucial issues because it is for Adjarans, Muslim 
Adjarans some sign if they will construct this new mosque it means that they have 
acceptance and that’s why it is not only uh religious issue that this Orta Jami this old 
mosque is not sufficient and they need another mosque but at the same time these building 
of the new mosque has so social and so cultural meaning that it means acceptance of 
Muslims and acceptance of freedom of religion and what I have mentioned for me is that 
somehow test for society and for state because there is  no such a reason why Muslims 
could not build this mosque because by law and by constitution they have such a rights but 
there is only bureaucratic technical hinderances that uh and uh its reflects that they are 
afraid.  So, I know some of the politicians in Adjara told me that when we give them such a 
permission the Adjaran and Christian population against and that will start a riot, protest 
rally and they are afraid at the same time they use this issue in pre-election campaigns, they 
always promise Muslim minorities that please after election we will give you this 
permission, it’s such an issue for political games.  So and also maybe it interesting too that 
in also Georgian orthodox church plays a very important role because this discourse that um 
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mosque have no place in Georgian territory or in Adjara and Adjara is Christian land this 
discourse is promoted by Georgian orthodox church and it is especially in Adjara that they 
have such a narrative that Adjaran that Adjara was the first place that Christianity was 
brought to Georgia from apostle adios(?) apostle Andrea(?) has first time preaching about 
Christianity and so for the church this part of Georgia has additional meaning that first 
Christian part of Georgia.  and it’s become stronger among this narrative stronger among 
Christian Adjarans and maybe you know they have such a petition against not to build this 
church and several rallies in Adjara.  But maybe it is interesting for you how it changes its 
protest discourse because in 90s after independence nobody knows there is Muslims that 
Muslims want another mosque even, I would say that most of Georgians do not know that 
Adjarans are Muslims and if they are practicing this till today.  In 2009 when there was this 
partitive(?) agreement between Turkey and Georgia, it was the first time when Georgia 
society discovered that oh Adjarans are Muslim and turkey will build a mosque.  and I think 
it was this time when perception of this mosque was connected with turkey was constructed 
and when today this community, Muslim Adjarans say that we will construct this mosque 
with our own funding, without donation from turkey.  society has this picture that turkey 
will build this and even this connection with these names, Azizye mosque even this mosque 
will have no such a name et cetera but in this time there was a lot of Turkophobic sentiment 
and sentences and it’s still alive and many people use this discourse what was constructed 
in 2009 and you know this agreement was cancelled.   
08:46 Logan: ok interesting so would you say that um a lot of the pushback from the 
Adjaran community is it like anti-Turkish or anti Muslim, would you say? like or is it kind 
of both 
Sophie: whether they are against turkey or 
Logan: yes 
Sophie: ah ok  
Logan: so, like when people protest against these uh the Muslim people building this 
mosque is it because, is it an anti-Turkish thing or is it an anti-Muslim thing.   
09:22 Sophie: I think Turkey is the main enemy in this discourse, but um so in this day its 
connected with the anti-Islamic and Islamophobic sentiments too but in Adjara, so in 
Adjara it’s mostly anti turkey sentiments and its even.  I think it’s also interesting that no 
only Christian Adjarans have this Turkophobic sentiment even Muslim Adjarans.  It’s very 
interesting because they accept that they are Muslims but they want not to have such a 
historical or cultural religious tie with turkey.  I think it’s why they want to be connected 
with Georgia.  and they are afraid that if we have such a positive connection or acceptance 
of turkey, they are Georgianness will be under question maybe.  but you could not show 
any difference between Christian or Muslim Adjaran when they are speaking on turkey.  
both communities are saying that turkey has a lot of business and they have occupied our 
territory, I mean territory for business.  so, there is no difference.   
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11:15  Logan: um, ok so I guess, I wanted to ask, what is it that people are afraid of, of 
turkey exactly, I mean so I understand that turkey has a lot of influence in Adjara meaning 
that they have a lot of businesses and stuff and um you know Islam and stuff, what is 
people are afraid are they afraid that turkey is going to take it back or something, I mean 
11:49  Sophie: so um I think this issue should be researched very deeply and its very broad 
because I think behind all these Turkophobic or Islamophobic tendencies is another reason 
why they are so xenophobic, I think first of all that they have discovered that everything in 
Adjara and in particular Batumi is deeply changing and its economically and social and 
what are they think that all this business, casinos, and such owners are people from turkey 
and they see that what are they own casinos or restaurants and I think that these over, how 
to say, a lot of foreigners in Adjara, but turkey is the most presented and this historical 
connection with ottoman empire and from on the one hand Adjarans want to forget these 
connections, and on the other hand they see that turkey is once again in Adjara and they 
want.  it’s so...economical and historical memories and they want to be separated from 
these countries.  they use...they have a lot of benefits from turkey, they are working in 
turkey and they have even benefitted in Adjara.  but I think that this economical changing is 
linked with this cultural perception that turkey is other country and they.  so I...it should not 
be separated, this cultural memory and this current times is turkey as rich man who has 
everything in Adjara and I think there is statistical data where it shows that not turkey but 
Russia and Azerbaijan have most properties, but it is in reality, but Adjarans have another 
perception, but statistical data shows another picture but in the city they do not see 
Russians, they see Russians as tourists, only tourists, but they do not know that they own 
more property than Turkish people.  So... 
Logan: ok 
Sophie: I think that they will always have a differentiation in perception of enemies, they 
will preserve this picture of turkeys, but my own view is that I think this Turks as enemies 
very modern phenomenon, even it has for Adjarans its connected with history but turkey as 
an enemy is very modern and they, so they need someone who is responsible for this 
economical changes and very rapid, so its raising this social um inequality and they see that 
turkey is responsible for these changes. 
Logan: right, ok interesting ok...um and then I also want to talk about the orthodox church 
for a minute, so these kind of anti-Turkish, like these these...who is kind of perpetuating 
these feelings of like anti-Turkish, I mean like you said people kind of perceive the Turks 
as the ones who are building, I mean is there somebody that’s like pushing these feelings, I 
mean who keeps perpetuating this? 
16:59 Sophie: so I think that in, after 2009 when this agreement, there were negotiations 
between Georgia and turkey and Georgian, so...Georgian orthodox church was against this 
agreement and that’s why this negotiation was annulled and cancelled, since this time I 
think Georgian orthodox church was such an institution who has transferred these 
economical changes, or these Turks as enemies and have connected this with ottoman 
empire because first time we hear from church that these mosque new mosque will be a 
sign or symbol of ottoman empire and it was so added that there was such a, there was 
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always such a, I won’t say Turkophobic but some envy it may be said that they have more 
capital in Adjara so, but it was not so it has not cultural and religious dimension, and I think 
it was Georgian orthodox church who have added this facet to this issue, but in current time 
I think this ultra-radical groups, sort of far right groups and its nowadays difficult to 
distinguish who uses, they use...this new mosque is very fruitful issue for radical groups 
and they instrumentalize it always, show turkey will build this mosque and nowadays its 
mostly fat right groups have this Turkophobic sentiment and aim...to help Georgians, it’s 
always Adjara, we should help Adjara and turkey from turkey and they use this ottoman, 
even this word was not used in 90s, it was turkey, but...Turkophobic discourse comes 
from....remembering that ottoman empire was fighting with Georgia etc. and these groups 
are using these historical menace and mostly fake news, or fake news information but it’s 
connected to religious and national sentiments, but 90s and 2000s church was also who has 
this main discourse and Turkophobic views and now it’s more pluralistic I would say, 
everyone uses it. 
20:51 Logan: ok um but would you say is the church still kind of perpetuating this today? 
20:57 Sophie: yes!  
Logan: and it’s just kind of added on by  
21:02 Sophie: yes, in Adjara, particularly in Adjara because...priests in Adjara are 
preaching till today that Adjara should return to Georgia, should Christianize should and 
they are main actors who are against mosque because all rally, protest rallies were 
conducted by priests. 
21:27 Logan: ok um, now you said that...this, even in the 90s this didn’t really happen very 
much, is this a new thing where the church wants to Christianize... 
Sophie: and church has become also stronger in the 90s it was, it had not such an influence 
and its  
Logan; ok so tis because the...would you say it’s because the church has gotten stronger it’s 
kind of... 
Sophie: I think both, because it...this...um...Adjara comes on political platform of 
government when nobody was discussing Adjara, it was some political issues that this 
autonomous republic was semi- autocratic, 
Logan: ah yea until like 2004? 
Sophie: yes that’s why...Aslan Abashidze was governing and he was dealing with priests 
with muftis, so he was a quasi-authoritarian and we did not know what happens and in this 
time it was um also he was dealing with this with some quasi negotiation but after that after 
the rose revolution that means that this is open question Muslims need new mosque and 
state has, state was morally bound, so I remember Saakashvili said that we should build this 
mosque but society was against this and they were afraid that people will protest and they 
remain so. 
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Logan: ok um interesting so...23:27 so I’m interested in how you said that the church’s 
power is growing, is it growing there in particular or is it just kind of growing in Georgia as 
a whole? 
Sophie: in Georgia 
23:41 Logan: ok um like would you say that it started to grow after the rose revolution? 
Sophie: um, I would say... 
Logan: is it related... 
Sophie I would say after rose revolution it’s a more obvious but I would say after 
Shevardnadze because Shevardnadze was uh so first politician who in public debates who 
accepted the role of the church and always mentioned that we should accept patriarchal 
what patriarch said, it so last instance, etc. so I would say that this loyalty is a connection 
between state and church began since Shevardnadze time, but after rose revolution, it was 
more obvious in various spheres and it was...I would say it was a competition because state 
wanted some autonomy on several spheres but has no chance because church was very, has 
a very high authority and especially when it refers to cultural heritage and religious issues 
so and... 
25:15 Logan: hm, ok, now this next question might sound like an obvious question but, 
what is the church's I guess intention in Adjara, I mean like is it their intention to just 
Christianize all of the Adjarans, you know what I mean I mean their fantasy goal is it for 
them to Christianize all the Adjarans... 
Sophie: mmmhm [in agreement] 
Logan ...is it so they can increase their influence there  
Sophie: yes I...I think so because, yes, first of all is the Christianizing and um while 
Georgian orthodox church...um Christianity or religious issues is linked with nationality for 
Georgian orthodox church too so and more church perceived for Georgian society as some 
strong holder or some defender of national identity and for church is for some kind of 
missionary work and is Christianizing and at the same time preserving nationality so I think 
it has a religious and national meaning too, so that’s why in early 90s Georgian orthodox 
church sent priests in Adjara in this time church and patriarch has not so authority as today, 
but they began this new life after independence in Adjara and preaching Christianity and 
you should return...uh they use this word return, that we are Christians and we should return 
to Christianity and uh it means a lot for whole Georgian and uh Christianity in Georgia so 
...and it’s all this till today. 
27:31 Logan: ok, um ok yea I think that was everything all the questions I had
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